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Wrongful Living
Alberto B. Lopez & FredrckE. Vars
ABSTRACT: Executing an advance directive that specifies a patient's wishes
regarding end-ofife medical care is an exercise of self-determination--a
conscious choice about the degree and type of medical intervention one wishes
to receive under end-of-life circumstances. Empirical studies, however,
consistently report that healthcareprofessionalsfail to comply with advance
directives; violations of a patient's interest in self-determination are
alarmingly common. From a practical perspective, the conduct of either
patients or healthcare professionals may make an advance directive
unavailable, which results in noncompliance. Legally, courts have
historically rejected claims for "wrongful living" associated with the
prolongation of life that results from unwanted medical intervention. As a
result, healthcare professionalsfear the liability threatened by a wrongful
death claim more than the legal exposure risked by keeping an individual
alive despite a contrary mandate in an advance directive.
In response to practicalconcerns regardingavailability, this Article proposes
the creation of a nationwide registry of advance directives and argues that
sanctionsfor violations of professional responsibility as well as the risk of
liabilityfor legal malpractice encourage utilization of the proposed registry.
To realignthe skewed legal incentives, this Article arguesthat the compensable
harms associatedwith battery and negligence claimsfiled in lieu of "wrongful
living" claims should include the loss of enjoyment of life. Because damages
for loss of enjoyment of life are rarely mentioned by courts or scholars in the
context of violatingadvance directives, this Article describes loss of enjoyment
of life damages and argues that such damages should be compensable in the
same manner that tort law compensates for similar injuries that lack an
objective market value. In combination, the practical and legal proposals
incentivize compliance with an advance directive and thereby expand the
protection afforded a patient's interest in self-determination.
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INTRODUCTION

The Hippocratic Oath, which dates from the 4 th Century BC, represents
"an expression of ideal conduct for the physician."' As part of its prescription
for "ideal conduct," the ancient Oath commands physicians to keep patients
"from harm and injustice."2 Updating the traditional injunction to keep
patients from amorphous "harm and injustice," the contemporary Oath
frequently commands physicians to avoid the specific "traps of overtreatment
and . . . nihilism."3 Two recent physician-authored books, however, cast
substantial doubt on how well medical professionals adhere to the Oath's
mandate regardless of its phrasing. In his best-selling book Being Mortal, Dr.
Atul Gawande asserts that a physician's default impulse is to continue
treatment because "rarely is there nothing more that doctors can do."4 The
consequence of medical decision-making by default can be substantial
because aggressive treatment could be "devastating to a person's life" or what
is left of a person's life.5 More graphically, Dr. Jessica Nutik Zitter's Extreme

Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS (Mar. 26, 2oo), http://www.pbs.org/
I.
wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html.
2.

Id.

the phrase
Id. Interestingly, the Hippocratic Oath is commonly thought to include
3.
Shmerling,
"First, do no harm." However, the Oath does not include such a phrase. See Robert H.
AM),
11:27
2015,
14,
(Oct.
BLOC
HEALTH
HARV.
PUB.:
HEALTH
HARv.
First, Do No Hfarm,
https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/first-do-no-harm-201 5101 3842 1.
(2014).
ATUL GAWANDE, BEING MORTAL: MEDICINE AND WHAT MATTERS IN THE END 173
4.
5.

Id. at 2 20.
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Measureswarns that unthinking implementation of medical procedures places
patients on an "end-of-life conveyor belt."6 At the end-literally-patients are
"often comatose, tied down, and sedated" while "tethered ... to machines"
as
part "of a mechanized death."7
To derail thejourney toward "the end of life conveyor belt," statutory law
provides individuals with an opportunity to decide how end-of-life care should
proceed, if at all, by executing an "advance directive." The generic phrase
"advance directive" refers to various legal instruments-such as a living
will or
a durable power of attorney for healthcare-that permit an individual to
document wishes regarding future healthcare decisions.8 Each of these
instruments is governed by state law. Predictably, state statutes vary not only
in the requirements for execution but also in which specific documents are
recognized as legal instruments. For example, Massachusetts is one of three
states that recognizes an individual's authority to designate a person to make
future healthcare decisions on her behalf in the form of a healthcare proxy,
but does not recognize living wills.9 Despite differences, one basic policy
serves as the foundation for all state statutes: Individuals have a right to
control their healthcare decisions, including the decision to forego or cease
life-sustaining treatments.o Complying with the individual's decision respects
the individual's dignity, especially where medical treatment may serve only to
prolong the process of death while "providing nothing medically necessary or
beneficial to the person."- In short, advance directives protect individual

6. JESSIcA NUTIK ZITTER, EXTREME MEASURES: FINDING A BETTER PATI TO THE END OF LIFE
19-26 (2017).
Id. at 3 3 , 4 5

.

7.

8.
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 489.1oo (2017) (stating that "a written instruction, such as a living
will or durable power of attorney for health care, recognized under State law .. . relating to the

provision of health care when the individual is incapacitated").
9.

Important Differenes Between Health Care Proxies and Living Wills, MASS. MED. SOC'Y,

http://www.massmed.org/Patient-Care/Health-Topics/Health-Care-Proxies-and-End-of-LifeCare/Important-Differences-Between-Health-Care-Proxies-and-Living-Wills/#.WfaPVkyZOYY
(last visited Feb. 17, 2019).

10.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650(a) (West 2009); see also, e.g., IND. CODE 16-36-4-6
(West 2007)
("A competent adult has the right to control the decisions relating to the competent adult's
medical care, including the decision to have medical or surgical means or procedures calculated
to prolong the competent adult's life provided, withheld, or withdrawn."); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:2H-5 4 (a) (West 2018) ("Adults have the fundamental right, in collaboration with their

health care providers, to control decisions about their own health care unless they lack the mental
capacity to do so. This State recognizes, in its law and public policy, the personal right of the

individual patient to make voluntary, informed choices to accept, to reject, or to choose among
alternative courses of medical and surgical treatment.").
11. CAL. PROB. CODE § 46 5 0(b); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-5 4 (b) ("Modern
advances in science and medicine have made possible the prolongation of the lives of many
seriously ill individuals, without always offering realistic prospects for improvement or cure. For
some individuals, the possibility of extended life is experienced as meaningful and of benefit. For
others, artificial prolongation of life may seem to provide nothing medically necessary or
beneficial, serving only to extend suffering and prolong the dying process. This State recognizes

1924
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autonomy under circumstances where an individual is most vulnerable to
violations of dignity and autonomy.
Studies repeatedly conclude, however, that an advance directive is little
more than a paper barrier against unwanted prolongation of life. A 1991
study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, for example,
reported that the inclusion of an advance directive in a patient's medical
record failed to promote compliance with a patient's preferences for lifesustaining care.- Worse yet, one survey analyzed physician responses to
hypothetical situations involving seriously ill patients with advance directives
and reported that the treatment decisions in those hypotheticals failed to
comply with the advance directive 65% of the time.'3 To that end, the
researchers concluded that other factors such as "[q]uality of life, treatment
outcomes, and family preferences," trumped a patient's documented
4
preferences for treatment.' At the far end of the extreme spectrum, another
group of researchers announced that "as far as [they] could tell, advance
directives were irrelevant to decision making" by medical personnel.s While
studies generally do not go so far as to label advance directives as
"irrelevant,"' 6 research resoundingly finds "physicians routinely ignore
patient instructions about end-of-life medical care."'7
The frequency with which advance directives are ignored is alarming, but
macro-level statistics elide the micro-cost of failing to comply with an
individual's end-of-life wishes. A 2017 New York Times article illustrates the
costs incurred by individuals when validly executed instruments regarding
medical care are ignored. Beatrice Weisman executed an advance directive
that gave her husband the authority to make medical wishes for her if she was
8
unable to do so herself.1 Following a stroke in 2013 that required lengthy
hospitalizations, Beatrice's husband executed a Medical Orders for Life
Sustaining Treatment ("MOLST") form that directed medical professionals

fundamental
the inherent dignity and value of human life and within this context recognizes the
right of individuals to make health care decisions to have life-prolonging medical or surgical
means or procedures provided, withheld, or withdrawn.").
Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life Sustaining Care, 324
12.
NEwENG.J. MED. 882, 885 (1991).
Do Other
Steven B. Hardin & Yasmin A. Yusufaly, Difficult End-ofLife Treatment Decisions:
13.
Factors Trump Advance Directives?, 164 ARCIIVES INTERNALMED. 1531, 1532 (2004).
14.

15.

Id. at '533.
and the Use of
Joan M. Teno et al., Do FormlAdvance Directives Affect Resuscitation Decisions

Resourcesfor Seriously Ill Palients?,5J. CLINICAL ETHIcs 23, 27 (1994)16. See Hardin & Yusufaly, supra note 13, at 1533 (stating that advance directives "serve an

important function" in that they promote communication between patient and healthcare
provider that may impact decision-making in the future).
Unconsented Life Support and
Philip G. Peters,Jr., The Illusion ofAutonomy at the End of Life:
17.
the Wrongful Life Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REv. 673, 674 (1998).
Paula Span, The Patients Were Saved. That's Why the Families Are Suing., N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
18.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/ io/health/wrongful-life-lawsuit-dnr.htmi.
2017),
10,

2o1g]
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to cease treatment if Beatrice's cardiopulmonary system failed.'9 Upon
finding Beatrice suffering a cardiac arrest in her hospital bed, hospital staff
"perform [ed] CPR .... defibrillated her with electric shocks, [and]
injected
epinephrine" even though Beatrice's MOLST form was on the top of her
medical chart.2o The efforts saved Beatrice's life, but broke her ribs and
caused her lungs to collapse during the process. 2 ' Subsequently, a hospital
spokesperson claimed that Beatrice had "made a remarkable recovery," but
Beatrice returned home "bedbound and relying on a feeding tube and
catheters" and required 2 4 -hour care while undergoing "intensive physical
therapy."22 Given the diminution in Beatrice's quality of life, the adjective
"remarkable" is, to put it mildly, inapt. As evidence of the
violation of her selfdetermination, Beatrice asked her son "why she's still here,"23 which is a
question for which there is no easy, let alone good, answer.
The physical and mental harm resulting from the failure to comply with
an advance directive is the product of symbiotic incentives within the fields of
medicine and law. During medical school, medical students are taught "how
to save lives, not how to tend to their demise."24 Indeed, medical training
instructs students to identify and treat the body's pathologies with available
medical technologies.25 Protocols are employed "to guide [physicians]
through increasing the levels of pharmacologic and technical support."2 6
While deploying treatments, physicians adhere to "an unspoken rule that
[they] resuscitate coding patients until they [are] almost in rigor mortis
... trying everything to keep them alive."27 The training, technology, and
"unspoken rule," however, create an environment where death seems
"optional or nonexistent."28 As a result, a physician may overlook
whether or
not the patient wants to avoid increasingly invasive treatments. 2 9 Patients are
"objectified" in a state of "custodial dehumanization"so
where patient
autonomy is an afterthought.
In addition to myopic focus on treatment, data collected for hospital
comparisons may also impact compliance with an individual's advance
directive. One of the key metrics in the calculation of such rankings
is the 3019.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.

22.

Id. The care is "all paid for out of pocket." Id.
Id. Beatrice's son has filed a lawsuit against the hospital because of its failure to comply
with the MOLST form. According to the article, the trial was scheduled for November 2017. Id.
24.
See GAWANDE, supra note 4, at i.
25.
Id. at
23.

.

3

27.

28.
29.

30.

See Zi-TER, supra note 6, at 31.
Id. (noting that doing so involved "sticking large catheters into every possible orifice").

Id. at 32.
Id. at 3 i.
Id. at

33

, 22 3

.

26.
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day mortality rate after a given medical procedure, which is the "traditional
this
yardstick for surgical quality."3' Some states require hospitals to publicize
poor
with
hospitals
penalize
statistic and Medicare uses the statistic "to
medical
performance and reward those with better outcomes."s2 Doctors and
mortality
researchers fear, however, that the pressure to obtain positive 30-day
data creates a conflict of interest between the interests of the hospital and
those of the individual patient.33 To obtain positive outcomes according to
the 3o-day mortality standard, surgeons are not only "reluctant to withdraw
life support before 30 days, and less reluctant after 3o days," but may also
"override advance directives."34 For some patients the skewed decisionmaking results in a "sentence [e]" of a lengthy hospital stay or long-term care
facility.35 Given that individuals execute advance directives to address these
precise possibilities, collecting data for hospital comparisons by consumers
has the ironic consequence of creating an incentive to ignore the validly
executed wishes of those same consumers.
Whichever medical factors are considered in cases where a physician is
faced with the question of whether to comply with an advance directive, legal
exposure is likely to be an important factor in the decision-making calculus.
Historically, complainants have failed to obtain legal relief following a
medical professional's failure to comply with an advance directive. Numerous
plaintiffs have initiated causes of action, denominated as "wrongful living"
claims, against individuals and institutions whose actions prolonged the life
5
of an individual despite the existence of a valid advance directive.3 Courts,

Paula Span, A Surgery Standard Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015),
31.
https://www.nytimes.cOm/ 201 5 /o 3 /o3 /health/a-go-day-surgical-standard-is-under-scrutiny.html.
rate, see 3o-Day
Id. For an example of a hospital's notice regarding its 3o-day mortality
32.
Mortality Rates for Heart Attack, Heart Failure and Pneumonia at Cedars-Sinai, CEDARS-SINAI,

https://www.cedars-sinai.edu/Patients/Quality-Measures/External-Rankings/Center-for-Medicareand-Medicaid-Services/So-Day-Mortality-Rates-for-Heart-Attack-Heart-Failure-and-Pneumonia-atCedars-Sinai.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) ("The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
They
which collect these data, consider 3 o-day mortality rates to be an 'outcome of care' measure.
center.
show what happened after patients with certain conditions received care at a medical
Such measures show whether a hospital is doing well at preventing complications, educating
the hospital
patients about their care needs and helping patients make a smooth transition from
to home or another type of care facility."). For an explanation of how the metric is used, see
Hospital Compare: 30-Day Death (Mortality) Rates, MEDICARE.Gov, https://www.medicare.gov/
hospitalcompare/Data/Death-rates.html (last visited Feb. 24, 20 19).

33. Span, supra note 31.
34. Id. (quoting Dr. Douglas White).
published studies on this,
35. Id. (noting that one physician stated that "[t]here are no good
see").
we
but it's something
life claim. A wrongful living
36. A wrongful living claim is distinguishable from a wrongful
wishes. See generally A.
claimant's
the
against
claim asserts that medical treatment impeded death
Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wnmgful Living Cause of Action, 75

other
GEO. L.J. 625 (1986) (explaining the wrongful living claim). A wrongful life claim, on the
prevented a
have
would
that
information
provide
to
failure
the
for
compensation
seeks
hand,

Life": The Right Not to Be
specific person's birth. See Thomas Keasler Foutz, Comment, "Wrongful

2019]
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however, brush aside wrongful living claims for a variety of reasons. Some
courts circumvent the issue by asserting that a claim for wrongful living is not
part of the common law and any such claim should only be recognized after
legislative enactment.37 Other courts fail to recognize wrongful living claims
because of the absence of a legally cognizable injury to the patient or the
difficulty in computing damages associated with prolonged life. For those
courts, "the status of being alive does not constitute an injury" even though
an individual receives unwanted medical intervention that prolongs the
individual's life.3 8 Simply put, courts are exceptionally reluctant "to weigh the
value of impaired life against the value of nonexistence" because of the
"existential conundrum" presented by the question.39
The judicial refusal to recognize "wrongful living" as a compensable tort
claim creates a legal asymmetry that threatens an individual's interest in selfdetermination as expressed in an advance directive. A patient's death can lead
to a wrongful death lawsuit,4o which is a well-known, and feared, cause of
action for medical professionals. By the same token, medical professionals
also know that the risk of liability for ignoring an advance directive is low
regardless of the law or facts.4' In combination, the liability cost of an
erroneous medical decision to end life could be staggering while the liability
cost of an erroneous decision to prolong life in the face of an advance
directive is likely to be insignificant. Therefore, the decisional balance tips in
favor of erring on the side of prolonging life. As evidence of the role that risk
management plays in medical treatment, one hospital administrator flatly
declared that a hospital "would 'rather have a wrongful liv[ing] claim than a
wrongful death claim."42
Despite the jurisprudential weight against holding medical personnel
responsible for failing to comply with advance directives, recent developments
hint at increasing recognition of harm when a patient's documented
preferences are violated. Healthcare professionals who fail to adhere to the
commands of an advance directive are increasingly subject to discipline by

Bo, 5 TUL. L. REv. 480, 485 (1980) (observing that a "wrongful life" claim does not rely on an
assertion of a doctor's treatment but instead on the notion that a child's birth would not have
occurred "but for" the inadequate advice given by the physician to the child's parents).
37.

Wright v.Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 166, 179 (Md.

1999),

superseded by

2000 Md. Laws 152, as recognized in Plein v. Dep't of Labor, 800 A.2d 757, 765 n.5 (Md.
2002);
see also, e.g., Slawek v. Stroh, 15 N.W.2d 9, 22 (Wis. 1974) (opining that such a tort should
be

the result of legislation because of its "vast social ramifications").
38. Cronin v.Jam. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 6o A.D. 3 d 803, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
39. Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 988 So. 2d 1 30, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (quoting a wrongful life case, Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992), and
applying it to a wrongful living cause of action).
40. Nadia N. Sawicki, A NewLifefor WrongfuldLiving58 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REV. 279, 284 (2013/14).
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Judy Greenwald, Medical Ethics & Risk Management; Liability at Life's End:
ProvidersRisk Suits in Reviving Patients,Bus. INS. (May 2o, 1996)).

1g28
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sanctioning boards. And administrative penalties have been levied upon the
institutions in which such violations occur.43 Furthermore, some courts
appear to be more receptive to claims that unwanted prolongation of life is a
compensable harm. In Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea, a physician
performed surgery on a patient with an advance directive that instructed
healthcare professionals to eschew "heroic measures" to prolong her life.44
Following a lung infection, a physician performed a surgery that resulted in
the removal of 2/3 of the patient's right lung, intubation, and subsequent
ventilation.45 After the patient's death, the administrator of the patient's
estate filed a lawsuit alleging that the surgeon "and other medical personnel
associated with the Hospital had subjected [the patient] to unnecessary
medical procedures, in particular her intubation and placement on a
6
ventilator ... in violation of [the patient's] Advance Directive." The hospital
moved for summary judgment based upon the immunity provisions in
Georgia's Advance Directive Act, but the court denied the motion and the
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.47 To avoid subsequent litigation, the
parties reached a settlement agreement that ended the legal dispute in May
2017.48

While professional discipline and administrative penalties may spark
cautious optimism about future compliance with advance directives, neither
is likely to create sufficient incentives for healthcare professionals to change
end-of-life decision-making. Professional discipline penalizes an individual
physician for a specific medical decision and the results of proceedings are
unreported, which makes them difficult to discover.9 Furthermore,
administrative agencies have "mostly levied paltry fines" against facilities in
which advance directives have been violated.5o For example, agencies in
Connecticut and Florida have assessed $1,370 and $i 6,ooo fines, respectively,
against nursing homes that resuscitated patients who had valid Do Not
Resuscitate orders in their medical files.5 Minimal monetary penalties are not

Treatment Without
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Clinicians May Not Administer Life-Sustaining
286-94 (2o 3).
213,
L.
BIOMEDICAL
I
&
HEALTI
gJ.
Sanctions,
Disciplinary
and
Consent: Ciii4 Criminal,
43.

396 (Ga. 2016).
44. Doctors Hosp. of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea, 788 S.E.2d 392,
Id.
45.
and ordinary
46. Id. at 397-98. The claims included "breach of agreement, professional
negligence, medical battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary
duty." Id. at 397.
the trial stage, see, for
47. Id. at 405. For another case where litigation proceeded to
example,Jones v. Ruston La. Hosp. Co., 71 So. 3 d 1154, 1155 (La. Ct. App. 201 1).
Patient's Wishes on Extending
48. Sandy Hodson, Hospital Settles Lawsuit About Failingto Honor
Life, AUGUSTA CIIRON. (May 25, 2017, 12:31 AM), https://www.augustachronicle.com/news/
201 7-5-25/hospital-settles-lawsuit-about-failing-honor-patient-s-wishes-extending-life.

cases. State medical boards
49. SeePope, supranote 43, at 289 n.5 Ii ("It is difficult to find these
organize their publicly available information only by clinician name and license number .....
See Span, supra note 18.
50.
51. Id.
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likely to affect the financial health of the penalized institution, but they could
negatively impact the grade and reputation of the institution on Medicare's
Nursing Home Compare website.52 In turn, low grades affect consumer
decisions regarding healthcare facilities.53 Regardless of the weight placed
upon grades of healthcare facilities, a grade on a website is one of a number
of factors that, presumably, impact consumer decisions about nursing home
care. In all likelihood, factors specific to the prospective residents/patients
such as the cost of care, location of the facility, and a family's degree of
comfort with facility staff outweigh a government-generated grade on a
website.54 While useful, website grades cannot meaningfully curb systemic
failure to comply with advance directives in a world where caregiving choices
are often circumscribed by money and geography.
Beyond professional and administrative sanctions, litigation that ends
with a decision that establishes healthcare provider liability for
noncompliance would affect end-of-life decision-making, but the signal from
the end of litigation may be muted by non-judicial dispute resolution. A case
like Doctors Hospitalof Augusta, for example, could be construed as a positive
development because the court declined to construe the statutory immunity
provisions broadly and permitted the lawsuit to proceed beyond summary
judgment.u5 Under those circumstances, healthcare providers are
incentivized to settle cases to avoid the risk of incurring a hefty jury award.
The settlement concludes the litigation between the parties but may not serve
as strong a stimulus for future conduct as clear precedent because the amount
of money transferred to the plaintiff and the conditions of settlement remain
unknown. Moreover, parties choose to settle litigation for a wide variety of
reasons-risk of liability, reduce trial costs even if a case is strong, avoid bad
publicity, and privacy. Without knowing the circumstances leading to a pretrial settlement, others facing similar situations cannot predict what the
consequences are likely to be from action or inaction. Although settlements
have the potential to influence future behavior, especially if they involve
known transfers of large sums of money, they do not unambiguously
incentivize changes in practices or policies that demonstrate commitment to
end-of-life self-determination.

52.

Id. (quoting Dr. Pope for the comment that consumers research facilities for grades);

see Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/

search.html (last visited Feb.
See Span, supra note
53.

17, 2019).

18.

54.
Marcelo Coca Perraillon et al., Nursing Home Response to Nursing Home Compare: The
ProviderPerspective, MED. CARE RES. & REv. 1, 5 (2017) ("I think the majority of people
[focus on]

on the aesthetics when they walk in. The smell. How the staff is interacting. How they're
being
treated when they walk in. What the patients look like ... I tend to think they go more
on that
than statistical data." (quoting one nursing home administrator)).
55.

Doctors Hosp. of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea, 788 S.E.2d 392, 404 (Ga. 2016).
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that
The purpose of this Article is to propose a framework of incentives
directive.
advance
individual's
an
with
compliance
of
increases the probability
Part II of the Article traces the legal history of advance directives and engages
directives. Part III
the philosophical debate regarding the validity of advance
directives,
advance
identifies the practical problems associated with accessing
describes current methods of warehousing such instruments, and proposes
increase
that a national registry of advance directives should be constructed to
asserts
accessibility. To diminish the risk of registry underutilization, Part III
of
behalf
on
registry
the
into
directives
advance
enter
that attorneys should
to
exposure
as
well
as
sanctions
professional
of
clients and that the threats
of
IV
Part
so.
do
to
attorneys
for
legal malpractice claims provide an incentive
damages
living"
"wrongful
the Article counters the historical inertia against
loss of
by identifying a harm rarely addressed in the relevant literature-the
of
loss
situate
to
enjoyment of life. Furthermore, Part IV uses graphs
claims
enjoyment of life damages within the context of battery and negligence
filed in lieu of a valid tort claim for "wrongful living." Recognizing the
that
intangible nature of loss of enjoyment of life damages, Part IV also argues
of
more
no
be
should
damages
such
for
value
the absence of a quantifiable
existing
by
compensated
injuries
non-market
an obstacle than it is for other
not
tort doctrine. The Article concludes that the practical and legal proposals
the
increase
also
but
only promote the interests of the stakeholders,
an
advance
thereby
and
probability of compliance with advance directives
individual's interest in self-determination.
II.

JUSTIFYING THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES

The law governing advance directives seeks to maintain a delicate
balance: honoring individual autonomy at the end-of-life while respecting the
medical community's goal of saving lives. Indeed, several highly visible and
and
publicly debated cases involving the conjunction of individual autonomy
in
balance
end-of-life medical decisions place the challenge of mediating that
bold relief. During early 2005, for example, then President Bush returned
from his ranch in Texas to sign federal legislation that allowed a federal court
to intervene in the controversial and much-publicized Terri Schiavo case.56
that the
Regardless of public awareness, each individual case demonstrates
life
person's
a
saving
and
suffering
legal line between prolonging a person's
a
regulation,
legal
of
is, at best, blurry. Given the continuing indeterminacy
recognizing
of
recurring dialogue examines the theoretical legitimacy
advance directives as reliable forms of self-expression. Predictably, then, the
intersection
legal governance of advance directives unavoidably creates an
death.
and
life
of
nexus
the
at
philosophy
and
between legal doctrine

and Bush Signs Legislation on Schiavo
Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Congress Passes
56.
http://www.nytimes.COm/2005/03/2i/politics/congress2005),
21,
(Mar.
TIMES
Case, N.Y.
passes-and-bush-signs-legislation-on-schiavo-case.html.
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A BRJEFLEGAL HISTORY OFADVANCEDIRECTIVEs

Over a century ago,Justice Cardozo articulated the relationship between
individual autonomy, medical care, and liability in Schloendorff v. Society
of New
York HospitaL57 In one of the cases passages, Justice Cardozo asserted
that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
he is
liable in damages." 5 If an individual needing immediate surgery
was
unconscious and unable to consent to medical treatment, Justice Cardozo
allowed that surgery which might otherwise constitute an assault may
proceed
because of the emergency.59 In other words, a non-emergency
medical
intervention performed without an individual's consent is an assault
to which
liability attaches.6 o Within tort law, Justice Cardozo's statements
are often
considered to be the foundation for the law of informed consent.6
, Indeed,
the modern doctrine of informed consent provides that patients,
when
adequately informed about their treatment options, should have the right
to
consent to or refuse treatment.6 1 And in order to exercise informed
consent,
patients must possess a sufficiently detailed understanding of the potential
harms and benefits posed by a prospective treatment, the
available
alternatives to that treatment, or the option of withholding treatment. 6
3 Given
its patient-centric emphasis, protecting an individual's interest in autonomy
sits at the core of the doctrine of informed consent.
Despite the solid footing of informed consent law, neither common nor
statutory law recognized advance directives in the form of living wills prior
to
the mid-2oth century. Triggered by the outcomes of criminal cases
where one
individual aided in the death of another during that period, however,
groups
with foreboding names like the "Euthanasia Society" argued for a mechanism
by which an individual could memorialize her end-of-life wishes and
thereby
inoculate others from criminal prosecution.. Using insight from informed
consent law, mid-century legal commentators extrapolated "a patient's
right
57.

Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93-94 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing

v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
58. Id. at 129-30.
59. Id. at 130.
6o. Erin Talati, When a Spoonful of SugarDoesn'tHelp the Medicine Go Down: Informed
Consent,

Mental Illness, and Moral Agency, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 171, 175 (2009)
(characterizing the
holding as being "unless a patient is unable to consent and an emergency
intervention is
necessary, any intervention by a physician done without consent constitutes
assault").
61.
Id. at 174-75 (pointing out thatJustice Cardozo's comments reflected
earlier comments
made by the Supreme Court).
62.

.

Id. at 1 7 5
63.
Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death
with Dignity, 8 i
TExL. REV. 1823, 1833 (2003).
64.
Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living
Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539,
540-44 (1969).
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to consent to or to refuse treatment" to argue that "a patient may refuse
6
not
treatment which would extend his life." 5 In cases where a patient did
vegetated
indefinite
of
state
possess the "desire to be kept in a [permanent]
to
animation," a 1969 law review article proposed that a patient be permitted
becomes
condition
include a clause in a consent to treatment form that "if his
incurable and his bodily state vegetative with no possibility that he could
be
recover his complete faculties, his consent to further treatment would
terminated."6 6 In theory, the proposed clause barred a physician from taking
to
further action to prolong a patient's life and a "patient would be permitted
6
the
denominated
article
The
7
inaction."
die by virtue of the physician's
the
proposed document by a litany of phrases-"a declaration determining
bodily
for
termination of life," a "testament permitting death," a "declaration
autonomy," a "declaration for ending treatment," a "body trust," "or other
68
the
similar reference." One of the suggested monikers affixed itself to
to identify a declarant's end-of-life
proposed instrument and has been used
6
9
will."
living
time-"a
intent since that
Seven years after the phrase "living will" first appeared on the pages of a
in
law review, California became the first state to enact a living will statute
who
representative
state
1976.70 Like many pieces of legislation, the
introduced the bill proposing recognition of living wills was motivated by
state
personal experience to change the law. In 1972, a future California
of
degree
and
representative's mother-in-law wished to delimit the amount
did
law
medical treatment she received as she faced a terminal illness, but the
not countenance a legal right to do so.71 Two years later, the newly elected
state representative placed a living will statute on California's legislative
into law.72
agenda, but the bill failed to gather sufficient support for passage
living will
a
proposing
bill
a
Undeterred, the state legislator again introduced
law.73
become
to
support
statute two years later and the bill gained sufficient
permitted
only
not
that
California's statute created a "Directive to Physicians"
be
an individual to specify the amount of medical intervention that should

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 5 47.
Id. at 5 5 0-51.
Id. at
Id.

55

1.

rather than "patient,"
Id. (emphasis omitted). We generally use the term "declarant"
69.
execution of an advance
between
period
time
the
covers
also
and
broader
is
because "declarant"
directive and the beginning of medical treatment.
Planning Law and Policy, 88
Charles P. Sabatino, The Evolution of Health Care Advance
70.
MILBANK Q. 211, 213 (20io), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2980344/

pdf/milqoo88-021 i.pdf.

Medical Directive (Living Will, Power
Siamak N. Nabili (ed. William C. Shiel, Jr.), Advance
https://www.medicinenet.com/advance
of Attorney, and Health-Care Proxy), MEDICINENET,
(last visited Feb. 18, 2o19).
medical-directives/article.htm#advance-medical-directive facts
Id.
72.

7 1.

73.

Id
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administered under end-of-life circumstances, but also shielded a physician
from liability if she complied with the directive.74 Following California's
lead,
states enacted statutes that recognized advance directives in one form or
another and those statutes, albeit often in amended form, remain on the code
books of those states.75
While a proposal for a living will statute wound its way through the
California legislature, a case on the other side of the country sparked a
national dialogue about self-determination when facing end-of-life
circumstances. In In re Quinlan, a 1976 decision that was one of the first cases
to focus the public's attention on the issue,76 a father of a 21-year-old woman
in a persistent vegetative state asked a hospital to terminate his daughter's
medical treatment, but the hospital refused.77 Thereafter, the father initiated
a lawsuit to enforce his request on the ground that the refusal violated his
daughter's right of privacy.7 8 After concluding that the father had standing to
assert his daughter's privacy interest,79 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
recognized that the State possessed an "interest in the preservation of life."so
However, the court also maintained that "there comes a point at which the
individual's rights overcome the State interest."8 More specifically, the court
opined that the State and an individual's interests exist on a continuum in
"that the State's interests [] weakens and the individual's right to privacy
grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims."82
Given its relationship to privacy,3 individual autonomy forms the unwritten
foundation for decisions like Quinlan.
A little more than a decade later, the Supreme Court offered its opinion
based upon a similar set of unfortunate facts in Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health.84 In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan fell into a persistent
vegetative state following a traffic accident and her parents sought to cease
hydrating and feeding procedures on behalf of Nancy, which would result in
her death.85 At the time, Missouri required "evidence of an incompetent's

74.
75.

SeeSabatino, sufra note 70, at 213.
Id. at 214 ("The number of living will laws snowballed during the next ten years.").

76. Robert D. McFadden, Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies; Focus of '76 Right to Die Case, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/i2/nyregion/karen-ann-quinlan31-dies-focus-of-76-right-to-die-case.html
national debate").

77.

(observing that the case "became the center of a

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 654-57 (N.J. 1976).

78.
Id. at 662-63. The father asserted other claims, including an interference with the free
exercise of religion and cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 661-62.

-

Id. at 66o.
Id. at 661, 66 5
Id. at 66 4
.

79.
8o.
8S.
82.

Id.

83.

DanielJ. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 557-60 (2006).
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270-72 (1990).
Id. at 267 (explaining Nancy had "virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties").

84.
85.
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wishes as to the withdrawal of [life-sustaining] treatment be proved by clear
86
and convincing evidence." Because Nancy had only offered ambiguous
statements about the degree of care she preferred, the hospital "refused to
8
honor the request without court approval." 7 Nancy's father filed suit and
8
ultimately appealed defeats in state courts to the Supreme Court. A 5-4
Court majority held that Missouri had the power to apply a clear and
convincing evidence standard to requests to discontinue life-sustaining
treatment.89 In so doing, the Court opined "that the Due Process Clause
protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment."go Moreover, the Court recognized the possibility of
divergence between what Nancy's parents might desire and what Nancy would
want if she could communicate; therefore, "the State may choose to defer only
to those wishes [(Nancy's wishes)], rather than confide the decision to close
family members."g' Cruzan considered an evidentiary standard, but individual
autonomy in medical decision-making again played a central role in the
Court's opinion. Nancy's wishes-if known-controlled "[tihe choice
between life and death"; such a choice "is a deeply personal decision of
obvious and overwhelming finality."92

In response to escalating public concern following decisions like Quinlan
and Cruzan, Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act ("PSDA") in
their final
199o "to reinforce individuals' constitutional right to determine
from
benefit
that
facilities
healthcare
health care."9s Under the PSDA,
with
patients
provide
to
instructed
Medicare or Medicaid programs are

86.
87.
88.
89.
go.
the Due
decision
gi.

Id. at 28o.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 281.Justice O'Connor's concurrence also noted that "the liberty guaranteed by
Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal
to reject medical treatment." Id. at 289 (O'Connor,J., concurring).

Id.at286-87.
Id. at 281. For another case involving similar facts, see In re Guardianship of Schiavo,
a Florida lower court had the
780 So. 2d 176, 179-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
evidence presented). The
the
upon
based
care
medical
of
authority to order discontinuation
but also
litigation and media coverage of the Terri Schiavo case not only triggered a legal fight,
92.

Fight: The Case of Terri
a political battle. See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, From Private Ordeal to National
Schiavo, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.coM/2014/04/21/us/from-private-

played in the
ordeal-to-national-fight-the-case-of-terri-schiavo.html (discussing the role politicians
Schiavo case and their attempt to assert control over the case); Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick,
https://www.nytimes.
Even Death Does Not Quiet Harsh Political Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2005),
the
com/2005/04/01/politics/even-death-does-not-quiet-harsh-political-fight.htmI (discussing
case).
Schiavo
Teri
politicization of the

ACT: PROVIDERS
93. U.S. GEN. ACCT, OFF., GAO-9 5 -135, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION
OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 1-4 (1995); see
Robert S. Olick, Defining Features ofAdvance Directives in Laow and Clinical Practice, 141 CHEST 232,

Act in the wake of the
233 (2012) (noting that Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination
decision to incentivize advance directive completion).
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materials that detail their end-of-life rights upon admission to the facility.94
The materials should inform patients about the right to accept or refuse
medical treatments as well as outline the healthcare facility's policies that
affect that right.95 Furthermore, the healthcare facility must provide patients

with written advance directives and document the existence of an advance
directive in a patient's medical record.9 6 Importantly, an individual is not
required to execute an advance directive as a prerequisite to receiving care.97
Although Supreme Court decisions may have prompted federal action, states
had a wealth of legislation governing advance directives at the time of those
decisions; therefore, the PSDA deferred to existing state law while imposing
new requirements.9 8 Predictably, state law regulations varied widely.99 But
whatever jurisdictional variation existed in execution and recognition of
advance directives, Congress intended the PSDA to serve as a "Miranda
warning" for those facing end-of-life decisions.oo
As an empirical matter, the PSDA proved to be a successful prompt for
the execution of advance directives. According to results from a University of
Michigan study, the number of individuals aged 6O years or older who created
advanced directives increased from 47% in 2000 to 72% in 2oo after the

enactment of the PSDA.-o The problem, of course, is that merely increasing
the raw number of advance directives does little to incentivize compliance
with those instruments. Effectuating an individual's end-of-life wishes is, in its
most basic form, a two-variable equation: end-of-life self-determination equals
execution of an advance directive plus compliance. The PSDA satisfied its
stated goal of increasing the number of declarants, but the second variable
remained unaffected, which ultimately leads to empirical results that reveal
widespread violations of self-determination under life and death
circumstances. o

94.
95.
96.
97.

98.
99.

§§ 139 5 cc(f)(1)(A), 139 5 cc(f)(2), 1396a(w) (1)(A), 1396a(w)(2)
Id.§§ 1395 cc(f)(i)(A), 139 5 cc(f)(2), 1396a(w)(1)(A), 1396a(w)(2).
Id. §§ 139 5 cc(f)(1)(B), 1396a(w)(1)(B).
42 U.S.C.

(2012).

See U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., supra note 93, at 3-

Id. at 40- 4
Id. at 40.

1.

100.
Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives:
A History and
Assessment of the PatientSelf-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 249,
251 (1997) (quoting
Senator John C. Danforth, who introduced the bill in the United States Senate).
For further
discussion of the PSDA, see generally, e.g., Kelly C. Mulholland, Protecting the Right
to Die: The
Patient SelfDetermination Act of 1990, 28 HARv.J. LEGIs. 6og (1991) (analyzing
the creation and
impact of the PSDA); and Richard E. Shugrue, The Patient Self-Determination
Act, 26 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 751 (1993) (reviewing the evolution of medical autonomy rights leading up
to the creation

of the PSDA).

101.
Record Number of Older Adults Completing Living Wills, Trend Had Little
Impact on
Hospitalization Rates, Sci. DAILY (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2o1
4

/

04/1404020951o5.htm.
102.
See supra notes i 2-17 and accompanying text.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

1936
B.

[Vol. 104:1921

PHILOSOPHYAND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES

Despite the PSDA, state statutory law, and judicial decisions, considerable
to make
philosophical debate engulfs the validity of permitting individuals
Advance
decisions.0,
medical
binding decisions in the present about future
directive advocates argue that individuals should be able to exercise

future selves in the
precedent autonomy to make meaningful choices for their
4
event that they are later unable to do so.'o According to legal philosopher
Ronald Dworkin, an advance directive that was executed while an individual
was competent generally should control her treatment if she becomes
Following the loss of
cognitively impaired before the directive takes effect.7o5
to belong to
thought
be
can
mental capacity, a person's rights and interests
"emphasizing
the person either as a presently cognitively impaired individual
who has become
his present situation and capacities," or as an individual
life."' As
whole
of his
cognitively impaired thereby emphasizing "the course
advance
a result, the decision to comply with a cognitively impaired person's
directive depends on whether her previous, competent conception of dignity
factors into the decisional calculus.1o7 Although a person without any
his advance
cognitive ability has no sense of his own dignity and self-respect,
a whole.", o
as
life
his
for
respect
"show
directive could be honored if it would
person's
the
for
accounts
Complying with a person's advance directive, then,
as a
autonomy
precedent and prospective autonomy instead of viewing
capacity.
commodity in discrete units that are directly proportional to mental
Refusing to disaggregate autonomy gives individuals the ability to express
their values, and "[w] e allow someone to choose death over [life-sustaining
his right to
treatment], if that is his informed wish, because we acknowledge
that if a
a life structured by his own values."'o9 For example, Dworkin argues
his
transfusions,
blood
Jehovah's Witness's advance directive rejects
transfusion
a
where
accident
an
of
instruction should be followed in the event
rendered
would save his life whether he remains competent or the accident
incompetent,
him incompetent."o If the accident rendered him temporarily
he was given a transfusion in his "best interest," lived, and later became
believed worse
competent, he may "be appalled at having had a treatment he
treatment
for him than dying.""' Even if his family believes he would request

103.

(1990).
See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845, 857-61

and Minimally Conscious State,
SeeJukka Varelius, Respect for Autonomy, Advance Directives,
25 BIOETHICs 505, 506 (201 1).
ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT
104.

105.
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 221 (1993).

i06.
107.

Id.
Id.

io8.

Id. at 221-22.

og.
110.

Id. at 224.
Id. at 227-28.

I11.

Id. at 227.
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if competent, his previous direction should be followed because there is no
competent actor who is qualified to nullify his exercise of autonomy.
Thus,
Dworkin concludes that the cognitively impaired person's precedent
autonomy as expressed in his advance directive should be respected.' 3
Respecting a cognitively impaired individual's competent exercise of
precedent autonomy may make individuals uncomfortable.,4 A seemingly
happy but cognitively impaired patient may be denied life-sustaining
treatment because of an earlier decision that was made when the patient's
current condition was unforeseen."5 However, even if the patient's decisions
were ignored to align with her current interest in comfort, as opposed to her
earlier interest involving her conception of death with dignity, her autonomy
would be violated." 6 Her precedent autonomy should be respected, even if
she no longer has any concept of her sense of self, because the person who
became cognitively impaired, not just the presently cognitively impaired
person, deserves compassion, and the interests of the person who became
cognitively impaired persist." 7 Failing to comply with her advance directive
would be a paternalistic and uncompassionate rejection of how the patient
chose to end her life consistent with her concept of dignity when she was
competent to make that choice. 8
In opposition to Dworkin's defense of advance directives, critics argue
that precedent autonomy has no moral authority because an individual is
unlikely to have the same preferences when she receives treatment as when
she executed her advance directive.,9 The most common criticism, typically
attributed to Rebecca Dresser, maintains that the person who is receiving
treatment is a metaphysically different person than the one who created the
advance directive.
Because the two individuals are different people, the
former person exercising autonomy to direct the treatment of the latter is not
an exercise of informed consent by the incapacitated person. 2' Dresser
supports her position with empirical evidence that patients' preferences often
change from the time they execute advance directives to when they enter the
hospital for treatments. 22 Often referred to as the "Green Eggs and Ham
2

2o

112.

Id.
Id.at226- 3 2.

114.

Id.at228-29

115.
116.

Id. at 228.

117.
i 18.

Id.at23 o- 3 1.
Id.

119.

See Rhoden, supra note 103, at 857-58.
Elisabeth Furberg, Advance Directives and Personall
Identity: What Is the Problem?, 37J. MED.

120.

.

113.

.

Id.at228-2 9

& PHIL. 6o, 61-63 (2012).
121.
Jack Schwartz, Living Wills: Time to Say Goodbye?, 38 MD. B.J.,July/Aug.
2005, at 5, 8.

122.
Dresser, supranote 63, at 1823. For the results of studies investigating changes
in patient
preferences, see, for example, Peter H. Ditto et al., Context Changes Choices: A Prospective
Study of
the Effects of Hospitalizationon Life-Sustaining Treatment
Preferences, 26 MED. DECISION MAKING 313,
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Phenomena," Dresser and similar critics argue that individuals often believe
that they do not want life-prolonging treatments, but change their minds at
2 3
the moment they would receive the treatments.
Even if one grants the premise that advance directives guide the
treatment of a metaphysically different person from the individual who
a
executed the document, not all medical ethicists view the situation as
problem. 4 Some philosophers believe that individuals have "surviving
the
interests" that outlive the person who expressed them. 25 Accordingly, if
person who expressed the preference no longer exists in a metaphysical sense,
then the personal identity problem is irrelevant. The treatment preferences
whose
expressed in an advance directive represent surviving preferences
expressed
the
realizing
by
utility
subject's
implementation maximize the
of
preferences as best as possible. 26 Honoring the right to self-determination
effective
most
the
be
may
the person who exercised the advance directive thus
way to maximize utility, and respect for self-determination implies a respect
for the right to exercise precedent autonomy. 27
Contemplating how one wishes to die after experiencing a terminal
illness or injury or permanent unconsciousness is a serious undertaking. If an
individual has sufficiently strong preferences about his end-of-life care to
be
execute an advance directive, then his expressed preferences should
not
is
life
his
that
ensure
to
anxious
followed. Presumably, "[s]omeone
... prolonged by medical treatment is worried precisely because he thinks
that the character of his whole life would be compromised if it were." 2S Even
if a person is no longer competent, preserving her life merely because it can
be done without putting her in pain fails to honor her life as a whole. For
some individuals, then, the decision to terminate life-sustaining medical
treatment is an expression of self-definition because "[p] eople have a strong
interest in shaping their own version of a dignified dying process regardless
of whether they actually experience the feared degradation."

29

If fully

informed and correctly articulated, advance directives are desirable not just
as a mechanism to suggest the treatment an incapacitated individual may
his
want, but as a way to allow an individual to die in a manner consistent with
conception of dignity.
As a practical matter, articulating one's specific wishes for end-of-life
treatment is a significant challenge. Advance directives are often boilerplate
Timing ofAdvance Directive Completion
316-1g (2006); and Susan Enguidanos &Jennifer Ailshire,
and Relationship to CarePreferences, 5 3J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 49, 54 (2017).
Dresser, supranote 63, at 1835; Pope, supra note 43, at 235-37.
123.
See Furberg, supra note 120, at 61.
124.
125.

Id. at 66.

126.

Id.

127.

Id. at 68-69.
DWORKIN, supra note 105, at 228.
Norman L. Cantor, The Real Ethic ofDeath and Dying, 9

128.
129.

4

MIcH. L. REv. 1718, 1730 (1996).

2o0191]

WRONGFUL LIVING

1939

instruments that are criticized because of the ambiguous language used to
describe an individual's wishes under specific circumstances.'3 0 No advance
directive, of course, can address every situation that might be encountered;
therefore, the language is predictably broad to permit flexible application to
a variety of end-of-life situations. Moreover, criticisms based upon the
language of an advance directive again fail to honor a declarant's dignity. An
individual's dignity is enhanced by respecting even general statements of
values in advance directives. In any event the lack-of-specificity critique is at
most a problem of implementation. If advance directives are currently too
general to provide meaningful guidance in particular cases, then advance
directives should be made more specific, not abandoned entirely.'s
Regardless of the language employed in advance directives, empirical
studies suggest that individuals' preferences change over time and such
results form the basis of the metaphysical argument against advance
directives. 32 Whatever weight might be assigned to such studies, those results
should be understood to demonstrate that individuals do not have fully
informed preferences and not as ajustification to reject the utility of advance
directives as a whole. To that end, research also suggests that better informed
individuals may be able to exercise informed consent through an advance
directive. Older individuals, who have presumably considered their goals at
the end-of-life more seriously than younger individuals, "have more stable
treatment preferences."'33 The evolution of preferences suggests that
individuals should regularly update their advance directives and have
conversations about their treatment preferences with their doctors outside of
rushed, emergency settings.'s4 Accordingly, revisiting advance directives over
time mitigates the problem of inconsistent preferences.
III.

IMPROVING

ACCESS TO ADVANCE DIRECTIVES

From a functional and procedural perspective, advance directives and
wills share many characteristics. Functionally, each instrument provides a
mechanism by which an individual memorializes her intent regarding specific
end-of-life issues. Procedurally, each instrument must comply with statutory
formalities for due execution and the testator/declarant must possess the
130. See, e.g., ROBERT S. OLICK, TAKING ADVANcE DIRECTIVEs SERIOUSLY: PROSPECTIVE
AUTONOMY AND DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE 102 (2001) (noting the "pragmatic
criticisms

. . . . that directives too often are vague and ambiguous and fail to provide instructions
that
effectively guide care").
131. Clarifying the language typically appearing in advance directive forms is beyond the
scope of this paper.
132.
See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005) (discussing the implications of changing emotions and the
legal consequences those changes have in certain areas of the law).
133.
Id. at 220-21 (citing Peter H. Ditto et al., Stabhiliy of Older Adults' Preferencesfor LifeSustainingMedical Treatment, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 605, 613 (2003)).
134.
Enguidanos & Ailshire, supra note 122, at 53-54.
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mental capacity to execute the instrument. s5As a corollary to execution
to
requirements, advance directives and wills may be challenged for failure
6
challenges,
courtroom
Beyond
3
satisfy statutory execution requirements.
advance directives and wills share a practical problem--each instrument
might be unavailable at the critical time for decision-making because it is lost.
However, the absence of wills and advance directives expose the
testator/declarant to different legal consequences. If a will is lost, the lost will
to
presumption may provide a basis to admit the missing original instrument
probate. 37 If an advance directive is lost, on the other hand, issues involving
a
compliance are irrelevant, and an individual's life may be prolonged with
shortcomings
the
describes
Section
concomitant decrease in enjoyment. This
of current modes of warehousing advance directories, argues that a
centralized registry would improve access to advance directives, and proposes
legal mechanisms to incentivize registry utilization.
A.

ExISTING METHODS TO INCREASE ACCESSIBILITY-ADvANCE
DIRECTIVE REGISTRIES

Although the various types of advances directives are not universally
recognized by state statutes,, 3 the codes of an overwhelming majority of states
establish a framework that governs advance directives from creation to
implementation-and many of those statutory provisions are, more or less,
identical. To execute valid advance directives, statutes generally require the
9
declarant and two witnesses to sign the instrument.'s Once executed, a
declarant is charged with the responsibility to notify a physician or other
service provider of the existence of an advance directive and deliver it to the
provider. Illinois law, for example, recites that
PROB. CODE § 2-502 (NAT'L
For an example of will execution requirements, see UNIF.
135.
requirements
CONFERENCE OF COMM'NS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2oo8). For examples of execution
139.
note
infra
see
associated with advance directives,
WILL CONTESTS (2d
For will contests, see generally EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMASJ. REED,
136.
of challenges to
ed. 2018) (discussing the legal jurisprudence of contesting wills). For examples
§ 9718 (2017)
18,
tit.
ANN.
STAT.
Vr.
see
requirements,
execution
upon
based
directives
advance
because a declarant lacked
(describing the process utilized to challenge an advance directive
capacity to execute the instrument).
§ 4.1 (AM.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
137.
265 S.W. 3 d
LAW INST. 1999). For a case invoking the lost will presumption, see Estate of Turner,

709, 712-13 (Tex. App. 2008).

provision governing living wills.
Massachusetts, for example, does not have a statutory
138.
MASS.GOV,
Wills,
Living
and
Proxies
Care
Health
About
Law
Massachusetts
See

https://www.mass.gov/info-details/massachusetts-law-about-health-care-proxies-and-living-wills

& GRAY, http://
(last visited Feb. 23, 2019); see also Massachusetts Living Wills, HAMILL
Michigan
www.massachusetts-wills.com/living-wills.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (identifying
statutes).
will
living
without
states
additional
as
York
and New
2015) (enumerating execution
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A- 4 (c) (LexisNexis
139.
(describing
26:2H§
ANN.
STAT.
N.J.
5 6 (West 2018)
requirements for advance directives);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
execution and mental capacity requirements for advance directives);
advance directive).
§ 71-32.050 (West Supp. 2018) (detailing the formalities required to execute an
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it shall be the responsibility of the patient to provide for notification
to his or her attending physician of the existence of a declaration, to
provide the declaration to the physician and to ask the attending
physician whether he or she is willing to comply with its provisions.,io
As a corollary to patient-provided notice, a physician generally does not have
an affirmative statutory duty to inquire whether or not an individual has
executed an advance directive.'4' Upon receiving notice, a physician is
supposed to place the advance directive in the individual's medical record for
future consultation. 42 Although contained in an individual's medical record,
a healthcare provider is not statutorily required to comply with an advance
directive.43 Under those circumstances, however, the physician/provider
must transfer the declarant to a different facility.'44 If, on the other hand, a

physician complies with an advance directive "in good faith and pursuant to
reasonable medical standards," the physician is not liable for the
consequences associated with the cessation of treatment.'45
The statutory requirements of delivery and placement in a medical
record represent significant impediments to the effectuation of an
individual's end-of-life intent. Ironically, fault for missing advance directives
can often be assigned to the party intended to benefit from its execution
-the declarant. Taking what can only be described as an extreme precaution,
one person got a "DNR" tattoo on his chest, which triggered questions about
the ethics of complying with the tattoo upon admission to a hospital.146 Most

individuals, presumably, do not permanently ink end-of-life wishes on their
persons, but instead simply execute the document and either take it home or
leave it with an attorney. Either course of action has its risks. Advance
directives might be kept in safe deposit boxes or Bibles without telling anyone
where they are housed or left with a third party (such as an attorney) who

140. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3 5 / 3 (d) (LexisNexis 201o) (imposing the duty to inform on
the patient "[i]f the patient is able" to undertake these tasks).
141.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-1o4(1) (West Supp. 2017) (assigning
responsibility for notice to the patient); IowA CODE § 144A.3.3 (2017) (stating that
the declarant
must provide notice).
143.
144.

See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3 5 /
Id.
Id.

145.

Id.at 3 5 /

3

(d).

7

.

142.

146.
Gregory E. Holt et al., An Unconscious Patient with a DNR Tattoo, NEW ENG.J. MED. (Nov.
30, 2017), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/so.0 5 6/NEJMc, 7 1 3 3 4 4 (stating that there were
concerns about its legality and likely unfounded beliefs that tattoos might represent
permanent
reminders of regretted decisions made while the person was intoxicated" (footnote
omitted)).
Ethics consultants advised the physicians to comply with the tattoo's command and
the hospital
later obtained a copy of the patient's written advance directive. Id.
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cannot be contacted at a moment's notice.'47 One declarant, for example, left
an advance directive with his attorney, who proceeded to store the instrument
in his briefcase.148 Upon admission to the hospital, the declarant's healthcare
proxy could not reach the attorney to obtain the advance directive because9
the attorney was out of the office taking a deposition with briefcase in tow.1
The absence of an advance directive, of course, moots any question regarding
the liability of a provider for failure to comply the instrument. And more
the
importantly, the absence of an advance directive threatens to subvert
energy
mental
wishes of a declarant who likely expended a fair amount of
considering difficult end-of-life questions.
Rather than being internalized to the individual, some of the costs
associated with an individual's failure to ensure that an advance directive is
available are externalized to parties charged with making decisions about endof-life care. A family member, who wants to follow a patient's presumptive
wishes, might permit life-prolonging treatment only to discover the existence
0
of an advance directive to the contrary.o5 In other cases, missing advance
directives permit survivors to input their interests into the end-of-life calculus
under the stress of life or death decision-making. One patient in Florida, for
example, informed a nurse that he had an advance directive after being
extubated and placed on supplemental oxygen.' Although the patient's
medical chart did not include the advance directive, the nurse confirmed the
2
existence of the advance directive with the patient's spouse.15 But after 53
to
years of marriage, the spouse informed the nurse that she did not intend
the
that
believed
and
permit the hospital to suspend medical treatments
patient would recover.1s3 During their interaction, the spouse asked the nurse,
"What if ... this was your husband, would you give up so easily?" 54 Given the
absence of the advance directive in the patient's medical record and the
insistence of the spouse, the healthcare providers decided to "do everything
as long as we do not have a copy of the advance directive."'55 Amidst the

2015),
Paula Span, The Trouble with Advance Directives, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
147.
https://www.nytirmes.com/201 5/03/ 1 7 /health/the-trouble-with-advance-directives.html
(noting that such "[s]tories abound").
(Oct. 17, 2013, 6:oo AM),
Paula Span, Where's That Advance Care Directive?, N.Y. TIMEs
148.
https://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/so/1 7 /wheres-that-advance-care-directive.
patient. See id.
Id. The article does not detail what happened to the
149.
150.

See id.

153.

Id.

Wife, and Nurse, with Moral
Annette Tracey, End of Shift: Missing Advance Directive Leaves
151.
0/ l /o8/end-of-shifthttps://www.nurse.com/blog/201
o),
Dilemma, NURSE.COM (Nov. 8, 201
missing-advance-directive-leaves-wife-and-nurse-with-moral-dilemma.
attorney, and spouse
Id. The patient informed the nurse that the patient's physician,
152.
medical chart.
patient's
the
in
appeared
copies
those
of
none
directive,
advance
the
had a copy of
No reason is given for the absence. Id.

154.

Id.

155.

Id.
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soI
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uncertainty the nurse contacted the hospital's ethics committee as well as
other hospital staff to determine how to proceed.'s 6 The spouse eventually
delivered the advance directive and the hospital implemented the patient's
wishes.'57 Despite eventual compliance, the patient's failure to make certain
that his advance directive could be consulted at a critical time not only placed
the nurse in a professional and moral conundrum, but also permitted the
interests of his spouse to supersede his advance directive.
While individuals may lose advance directives and thereby place others
in a decision-making quandary, the presence of an advance directive in a
patient's medical record does not guarantee consultation. A soio study of
individuals who had executed an advance directive and given it to their
healthcare providers found that a majority of those individuals did not have
those instruments in their medical records.5 8 The investigators split survey
participants into two groups and found that one group of 245 people had
their advance directives included in their medical charts in a shockingly low
15% of cases while the second group of 566 patients had their advance
directives in their medical records in an improved, but still troublingly low,
47% of cases.59 And beyond the controlled environment of empirical study,
examples of cases where individuals deliver advance directives to hospital
personnel but those advance directives cannot be located when needed are

plentiful. Indeed, the patient in Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea

brought her advance directive with her to the hospital and it was included in
her medical record."6o However, hospital staff placed the advance directive in
the wrong location in the patient's medical chart and it was not discovered
until after unwanted medical intervention had occurred.' 6 ' Upon discovery, a
nurse uttered, "Boy, somebody has really messed up."'62 On some level,
"messing up" is predictable given the volume of paperwork
and stress under
which advance directives are consulted. Nevertheless, the frequency with
which advance directives fail to be located despite delivery to healthcare
providers is alarming. An individual may conform to the law from execution
to delivery and still suffer a loss of enjoyment of life because the advance
directive is, in essence, lost in plain sight.
156.
157.
158.
Elders,

Id. The other hospital staff members are identified as an "interdisciplinary team." Id.
Id. The husband died after a few days. Id.
Victoria Y. Yung et al., Documentation of Advance Care Planningfr
13J.

PALLIATIVE MED.

health issues. Id.

861, 862-63

(201o).

Community-Dwelling

The two groups were divided by age as well as

.

.

159. Id. at 864. Interestingly, these results are not confined to the United States. A recent
study of 998 patients in Germany who had given advance directives to their healthcare
providers
found that only 39.6% of those patients had those instruments in their hospital records.
See
Geraldine de Heer et al., Advance Directives and Powers
of Attomey in Intensive Care Patients, 114
DEUTSCIES ARZTEIILAIT INT'L 363, 363-64 (2017).
16o. Doctors Hosp. of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea, 788 S.E.2d 392, 395 (Ga. 2016).
161. Id. at 3 9 5 - 9 7
162. Id. at3
97
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To increase the accessibility of advance directives, some states have
created online registries of advance directives. Some online advance directive
while others
registries are created by statute and operated by a state agency
and
Michigan
in
Statutes
state.
the
are privately owned and recommended by
the
and
Registry
Mind
of
Nevada, for example, expressly create the Peace
not
chose
legislature
Living Will Lockbox, respectively. 63 The West Virginia
West
the
to create a registry by statute, but instead established an agency,
to
Virginia Center for End-of-Life, and it operates an "e-Directive Registry"
6
states
few
a
Furthermore,
4
Virginians.'
West
for
store advance directives
for
contract with private businesses to maintain advance directive registries
6
enter
"may
state
the
that
provides
law
use by the state.' 5 Oklahoma statutory
into contracts with private vendors" to operate its database of advance
66
Whether state or privately operated, the basic purpose of an
directives.'
needed
advance directive registry is to make advance directives available when
6
7
respected."'
so that individuals "will have their wishes for care known and
advance
Regardless of the identity of the operator, computerized
directive registries function in a fairly similar manner. To initiate the process,
the
declarants must complete a registration agreement that simply provides
the
identify
as
well
as
operator
registry
declarant's contact information to the
68
short
the
out
filling
After
type of instrument to be placed in the registry.
registration
registration form, the declarant submits the completed
in
agreement as well as her advance directive to the registry operator by mail,
registry
person at a designated office, or by uploading the documents on the

expressly to a
MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 400.1 o 5 d(i) (g) (West Supp. 2018) (referring
163.
LIVING WILL
2015);
(LexisNexis
449.920
§
ANN.
STAT.
REV.
NEV.
'peace of mind registry");
66
(last
1
LOcKBOx, NEV. SEC'Y OF STATE, https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=
2019).
visited Feb. 23,
(last
About the Center, W. VA. CTR. FOR END-OF-LIFE CARE, http://wvendoflife.org/about
164.
2002).
in
center
the
authorized
legislature
the
visited Feb. 23, 2019) (noting that
1 2 2, 12 2 (2016)
Preston Holmes, A Tour of State Advance Directive Registries, 37 BIFOCAL
165.
(listing those states as Washington, Vermont, and Oklahoma).
Oklahoma State
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102.1 (West 2016). Information on the
166.
advance directives to two
Department of Health website directs interested persons to submit
Directives, OKLA. STATE
private services, MyDirectives and U.S. Living Will Registry. See Advance
DEP'T HEALTH, https://www.ok.gov/health/Data-and Statistics/Center ForHealthStatsics/
[hereinafter OKLA.
Health-Care Information/AdvanceDirectives (last visited Feb. 23, 2019)
STATE DEP'T HEALTH].

END-OF-LIFE CARE,
Make Your Treatment Wishes Known, W. VA. CTR. FOR
167.
2019).
23,
Feb.
visited
(last
http://wvendoflife.org/home
(2019),
See, e.g., ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, ARIZONA HEALTII CARE DIRECTIVES REGISTRY
168.
(allowing
https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/bsd-ad-registration-agreement20ol901o7.pdf
SEC'Y OF STATE,
declarants to also change or revoke their prior registration); STATE OF CAL.
http://ahcdr.cdn.sos.ca.
(2015),
DIRECTIVE
CARE
HEALTH
REGISTRATION OF WRITEN ADVANCE
the storage location of an advance
gov/forms/sfl-46 .pdf (allowing declarants to also identify
registry).
the
within
instrument
directive if they opt not to house the
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website.,69 Importantly, the registry operator generally does not examine the
advance directive to determine if it complies with the formal requirements for
execution in the registry'sjurisdiction. To Once the advance directive has been
processed, the registry operator delivers a wallet card, a bracelet, and/or
stickers to the declarant with information that can be used to access the
declarant's file, such as a file registration number and a password.171 If a
declarant wishes to modify the stored instrument in the future, a declarant
may use the access information provided by the registry operator to update or
revoke the instrument as needed. 72
If a declarant's health circumstances warrant consultation with an
advance directive, the burden of communicating access information to
healthcare providers generally rests with the declarant. As a general matter,
healthcare providers are unable to locate a declarant's advance directive in
the registry without obtaining the access information from the declarant.'73
169. See, e.g., Advance Directives, ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, https://www.azsos.gov/services/
advance-directives (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (permitting submission by mail or in person);

Health CareDirectiveRegisty, IDAHOSEC'Y OF STATE'S OFF., https://sos.idaho.gov/hcdr
(last visited
Feb. 23, 2019) (stating expressly that email submissions will not be accepted); End ofLifeRegistry,
MONT. DEP'T OFJUSTICE: OFFICE OF CONSUMER PROT., https://dojmt.gov/consumer/end-of-liferegistry (last visited Feb. 24, 2019) [hereinafter MONT. DEP'T OF JUSTICE] (allowing
mail

submissions only); MIPEACEOFMIND, https://www.mipeaceofmind.org/Default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 23, 2019) (allowing submissions by upload or mail); VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
VIRGINIA
ADV ANCE HEALTH CARE DIRECTIVES REGISTRY: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION (FAQ)
2 (2016),

http://www.connectvirginia.org/wp-content/uploads/ o 6/04/FAQ-Sheet.pdf (last visited
2
Feb. 23, 2019) [hereinafter VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH] (allowing upload submissions only).
170.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36- 3 2 9 4 (B) (2018) (declaring that "[tlhe secretary of
state is not required to review a document to ensure that it complies with the particular statutory
requirements applicable to the document"); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § i 3oA- 68(a) (West
2009)
4
(stating that "[t] he Secretary is not required to review a document to ensure that it complies
with
the particular statutory requirements applicable to the document"). But see MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-9-5 03 (1) (2017) (asserting that "the attorney general shall determine if the declaration is
in compliance" with Montana's execution requirements).
171.

See, e.g., MONT. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 169 (detailing the wallet card and four

stickers to be placed on various pieces of identification such as a driver's license or insurance
card); End of Life Registry Programs, LA. SEC'Y OF STATE, https://www.sos.1a.gov/Ouroffice/

EndOfLifeRegistries/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) [hereinafter LA. SEC'Y OF
STATE] (describing a "do not resuscitate" bracelet to be placed on patients); Mich.'s
Advance
Directive Registry, MIci. DEP'T OF HEALTII & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.mipeaceofmind.org
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2019) [hereinafter MICH. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.] (describing a
wallet
card to be given to patients).
172.

See, e.g., VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 169.

See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, N.C. SEC'Y OF STATE, https://www.sosnc.gov/frequently
.asked.questions/bytitle/_advancehealthcaredirectives (last visited Feb. 23, 2019)
[hereinafter N.C. SEC'Y OF STATE] (suggesting that "you may want to make copies [of a registry
ID
card] for everyone who you would like to have access to your directives, such as your health
care
agent, family members and health care providers"); ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, ARIZONA
ADVANCE
173.

DIRECTIVE FILING GUIDE (2019), https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/BSDADFiling
Guide
0l.20g.pdf [hereinafter ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATIE] (stating that "[y]ou can share your password

with your appointed medical power of attorney, your doctor and the hospital or clinic where
you
receive medical care, and/or whoever you choose" and providing instructions regarding access);
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In other words, healthcare providers cannot perform independent searches
of registries to unearth a declarant's advance directive; the declarant must
communicate access details to the party needing access to the advance
directive. In theory, wallet cards, bracelets, and stickers are ever-present on
the person of the declarant; therefore, access information is readily available
to be communicated to healthcare providers when necessary. In the real
world, however, declarants might be unable to communicate access
information or fail to have their wallet cards on hand at a critical moment.
Recognizing this real-world possibility, registry websites frequently
recommend that declarants provide family members or physicians with file
numbers and passwords so that they can be delivered when needed.:74
Provided access is obtained, registries reduce the risk that an advance
directive will be unavailable due to loss by declarant or misfiling by healthcare
provider.
After obtaining identification information, most registries provide that a
declarant's advance directive can be viewed online. Vermont, for example,
and
publicizes that the instruments in its registry are "electronically stored
telephone."75
by
or
Internet
the
through
providers
may be accessed by
Consulting advance directives in state-run registries, however, is not always as
straightforward as reading a scanned copy of an advance directive on a
computer screen. Louisiana, for example, stores advance directives in a statewhen requested
operated registry, but only provides "copies of declarations
6
for
by any attending physician or health care facility."7 The website
advance
Michigan's Peace of Mind Registry, the name affixed to the state's
directive storehouse, asserts that the declarant's wishes "will soon be available
to your doctors and to a hospital, nursing home, or other healthcare provider
when you are a patient or resident."'77 Such a statement suggests that
healthcare providers have ready online access to advance directives, but the
FAQ portion of Michigan's website states that "[a] t this time Michigan health
care providers do not have electronic access to your advance directive. You
may present your wallet card to a health care provider so they can request a

need
VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supranote i 69 (stating that "[t] o provide access, these individuals will
online").
documents
your
view
to
order
in
card
ID
Wallet
the
from
Source
and
Number
Registralion
your
174.

OF HEALTH, supra note i 69.
See, e.g., MONT. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supranote 169; VA. DEP'T

to be
In contrast, U.S. Living Will Registry/Advance Care Plan Registry permits searches
number. See Iow the
performed using identifiers such as name, birth date, or Social Security
Registy Works, U.S. ADVANCE CARE PLAN REGISTRY, http://www.uslivingwillregistry.com/
howitworksind.shtm (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
VT. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
Provider Authorization and Obligations: Definition of Terms,
175.

http://www.healthvermont.gov/health-professionals-systems/advance-directives/provider-

supra
authorization-and-obligations (last visited Feb. 24, 2019); see also, e.g., ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE,
note 173; N.C. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 173.

176.
177.

LA. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 171.
MICH. DEP'T OF HEALTIl & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 171.
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copy of your advance directive."' 7 While the majority of registries provide for
online display of a declarant's end-of-life choices, registry storage does not
necessarily equate to immediate online access.
At a time when medical records are increasingly digitized for online
access, the number of states that have established online advance directories
is surprisingly low. Apple is initiating a feature on its Health app that permits
people to see various medical records on iPhones and the American Bar
Association created an app to store a user's advance directive,'79
but only 13
states had created online advance directive registries as of mid-2o16.,so
Louisiana first passed a statute creating a central repository for advance
directives in 1984,'8 but few states have mustered the political will to codify a
registry for advance directives. And when placed on agendas in state
legislatures, registry proposals often fail to survive the legislative process.
Legislators in Florida, for example, introduced bills to establish an advance
directive registry during the 2004 legislative session, but the bills failed to
gather sufficient legislative support for enactment 5 2 Seeking to avoid
legislative potholes, some state legislatures have studied the experiences of
states that maintain registries in advance of placing a registry proposal on the
legislative agenda. A report to Washington's legislature announced that the
Washington Department of Health had gained "national exposure" after
initiating its registry as other states sought advice regarding the creation and
maintenance of a registry.',8 Washington's experience and advice, ironically,
did not spur the creation of state-run registries in several of the inquiring
states. 84

178.
FrequentlyAsked Questions, MIPEACEOFMIND, https://www.mipeaceofmind.org/FAQ.aspx
(last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
179.
Natasha Singer, Apple, in Sign of Health Ambitions, Adds Medical Records Featurefor iPhone,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.COm/2o18/o l/24/technology/Apple-iPhonemedical-records.html; New ABA Mobile App Helps with Health Care Advanced Directives,
A.B.A. (April
16, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/
o 4/o4/newaba
2

.mobile-apph.html.
i So. See Holmes, supra note 165, at i 22-27.
181.

LA. STAT.

ANN.

§

40:1151

(2016)

(noting that the current code section was

"[r]edesignated from R.S. 40:1299-58.1 by H.C.R. No. 84 of the 2015 Regular Session. Added
by
Acts 1984, No. 382, § 1. Amended by Acts 1985, No. 187, § s, eff. July 6, 1985");
see also
End of Life

Registry Prograns, LA

SECRETARY

STATE,

https://www.sos.1a.gov/OurOffice/

EndOfLifeRegistries/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
182.

STATE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON QUALITY CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, STUDY ON
A STATEWIDE

ADVANCE DIRECTIVE REGISTRY, at ii (2005), http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Health
%2oPolicy%2oDocuments/ADregistry.pdf.
183.
WASH. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, LtVING WILL REGISTRY: A REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE
2 (2009), https://app.leg.wa.gov/ReportsToTheLegislature/Home/GetDF?fileName=Living

%20Will%2oRegistry_ 9 2ao 7 e2 i-6747-45eb-a8c8-f f 88fi 835.pdf
4 49

(identifying

Minnesota,

Alaska, Oregon, Nevada, and West Virginia as inquiring states).
184.
For example, Minnesota and Alaska did not create state-maintained registries.
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A primary impediment to legislative enactment of advance directive
registries is concern about the practical utility of such registries given start-up
costs. Washington's report assessing the feasibility of creating an online living
will registry described the practices of one of the major stakeholders in the
system as being a barrier to successful implementation with the simple
8
statement that "medical institutions are slow to change." 5 Interestingly, the
slow pace of change was not necessarily due to a lack of legislative support.
Washington "spent ...

$146,000 [on] registry computer start-up costs and

marketing material development" during the first year after its state-operated
8
registry became operational., An "in-kind donation from the Washington
State Medical Association[,]" allowed the state to mail 7,500 letters to
physicians, 2o,ooo brochures to the public, and

12,000

pamphlets, 3,000 fact

8
sheets, and 500 posters to healthcare providers. 7 Despite the initial
would
transaction costs, Washington's reporters opined that operating costs
88
take
To
decrease as the number of registry participants increased.
advantage of the economies of scale, however, the number of participants
needed to increase and "[p]ractical experience has shown that doctors and
hospitals have been slow to adopt the registry system; many simply do not
8
check them when a patient is admitted."' 9 Washington's concern about
registry utilization at inception was not unfounded-both Vermont and
Nevada experienced low rates of healthcare provider enrollment when each
began its state-run registry.,,o In combination, the start-up costs and the
probability that the registry will go unused by healthcare providers present a
substantial disincentive for legislative action.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, one group of stakeholders that
stood to benefit the most from the creation of a registry-the public-has
expressed concern about storing advance directives at the state level. A
number of state-run registries are maintained by the Secretary of State,'9' but
housing the registry in that governmental agency may create a conflict of
interest in the minds of possible registrants. A focus group in Arizona, for
example, feared that housing the registry within the Arizona Department of
Health inappropriately linked healthcare options to fiscal decision-making,

185.

WASH. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTII, supra note

186.

Id. at

187.

Id.

188.

183,

at 9.

16.

Id. ("When all slots are occupied with participants, the cost per participant is approximately

participant goes down.").
$104. As more space is purchased and occupied, the cost per
Should You Use Them?, NOLO,
Registries:
Directive
189. Shae Irving, Living Will or Advance
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/living-will-advance-directive-registries-should-youuse-them.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
WASH. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, supranote 183, at i i.
1go.
See, e.g., CAL. SEC'Y or STATE, ADVANCE HEALTH CARE DIRECTIvE REGISTRY,
(last visited Feb. 23,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/registries/advance-health-care-directive-registry
2019); IDAHo SEC'Y OF STATE, HEALTH CARE DIRECTIVE REGISTRY, https://sos.idaho.gov/hcdr

ig.

(last visited Feb.

23, 2019).
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which threatened to "limit the health care registrants receive."192 Vermonters
joined Arizonans in the fear that a registry would decrease the quality of
medical care offered to individuals who had advance directives in the
registry.'93 Executing and registering an advance directive, of course, does not
equate to a reduction in medical services available to a registrant. If medical
care diminishes, the diminution results from healthcare professionals
adhering to the individual's documented intent rather than the decision of
an official at a state agency. Nevertheless, public concern about sacrificing
end-of-life care to save money reflects a deep-seated belief that has impacted
other efforts to restructure healthcare, such as the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.' 94
While stakeholder objections and start-up costs represent obstacles for
legislative creation of a state-run registry, the cost of maintaining the registry
is an on-going concern after the registry goes live. In fact, fiscal savings
associated with defunding a registry may imperil the continuing efficacy of
existing registries. The national exposure generated by Washington's passage
of its advance care registry dimmed to the point that Washington ceased
operating its state-run registry in 2011.195 Apparently the program simply "ran
out of money" and eliminating "the registry save [d] the state $104,000 in" its
budget.'9 6 Similarly, Oklahoma passed a statute in 2oog that required its
Department of Health to "establish and maintain" a registry pursuant to rules
developed by the State Board of Health.197 Six years later, the legislature
amended its statute to permit the Department of Health to contract with a
private vendor to fulfill its statutory obligations. S Thereafter, the Oklahoma
State Department of Health ("OSDH") solicited contract bids to run its
registry with one particularly telling requirement-"[a]ll services provided
under this contract shall be provided at no cost to the OSDH." 99 The OSDH
webpage now provides links to two private registry services, MyDirectives and

192.

STATE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON QUALITY CARE AT THE
END OF LIFE, supra note 182, at I7.

193.

Id.

194.
AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON LAw & AGING, MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT HEALTH CARE
ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES
1-2,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
Commissions/myths fact hcad.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
See generally
Vanessa Cavallaro, Comment, Advance Directive Accessibility: Unlocking the Toolbox
Containing Our
End-o/ILifeDecisions, 31 TOURO L. REV. 555, 584-85
(2015).
195.
Associated Press, Washington State Ends Living Will Registry, HERALDNET (uly 1, 201 1,
1:55 PM), http://www.heraldnet.com/news/washington-state-ends-living-will-registry.
196.
Id. (quoting a spokesperson for the Washington Health Department).
197.
63 OKLA. STAT. § 3102.1 (A) (20 16); Act ofMay 21, 2009, ch. 236, 2oo9 OKLA. SESS. LAW
1439 (providing for the establishing and maintaining of an advance directives registry).
198. Act of Apr. 1o, 2015, ch. 43, 2015 OKLA. SESS. LAW 88 (altering requirements
for
advance directive registry).
199.

OKLA. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, CREATING A STATE OF HEALTH: REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS

5 (2015), https://www.ok.gov/health2/documents/RFP%
%2oRegistry% 2oRe-Bid.pdf.
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U.S. Living Will Registry, to satisfy its statutory obligation to "establish and
maintain" an advance directive registry.2"

For states like Oklahoma, as well as Washington, Vermont, and
Maryland,2o

the availability of private vendors that build and maintain

advance directive registries provides a cost-free substitute for state-run
registries. Private registries not only make legislative funding concerns
irrelevant, but they also offer the benefit of extending beyond state lines; they
are national in scope. A declarant in South Dakota has the same access to the
registry as a declarant in New Mexico. Furthermore, some nationwide health
networks provide registry services for network members. Kaiser Permanente,
for example, asserts that " [i] t's important for all Kaiser Permanente members
to file a copy of their advance directive forms with Kaiser Permanente" so that
the forms may be scanned into its "Advance Directive Registry."o2 Similarly
several non-profit health information exchanges store advance directives for
individuals in specific geographic regions. The Rochester Health Information
Organization provides healthcare providers in New York "with immediate
access to critical information that could affect your treatment-particularly in
an emergency, when you may not be able to provide it yourself."2o3 In sum,
numerous non-governmental registries have emerged to fill the vacuum of
advance directive storehouses created by funding concerns on the state
level.2o4
B.

CENTRALIZING AN ADVANCE DIREC77vE REGISTRY

The proliferation of state-run and nongovernmental online advance
directive registries has had an unanticipated impact that might best be
described as Newtonian. On the one hand, increasing the number of
registries should, in theory, make advance directives more accessible to
healthcare providers thereby increasing the probability that an individual's
end-of-life intent will be followed. On the other hand, increased access to
advance directives using online access points risks registry underutilization.
The increased number of online databases makes it difficult to know which
registry to consult to find a declarant's advance directive if the declarant fails
to present access information on a wallet card or identification bracelet.
200.

201.
202.

See OKLA. STATE DEP'T HEALTH, supra note 166.
SeeHolmes, supra note 16 5 , at 122.
Advance Directives and End-of-Life Decisions, KAISER PERMANENTE, https://wa.kaiser

permanente.org/healthAndWellness/indexjhtml?item=/common/healthAndWellness/careDe
cisions/carePlanning/advancedDirecfives.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
(last
Inmediate Access to Critical Infrmatin, ROCHESTER RHIO, http://www.grrhio.org
203.
directives, see
visited Feb. 23, 2019). For a brief list of regional exchanges that store advance
Registries: A Policy
generally CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & TRANSFORMATION, Advance Directive
Opportunily (Sept 2011), www.chrt.org/document/advance-directive-registries-a-policy-opportunity.
U.S.
Holmes, supra note 165, at 122 (listing America Living Will Registry, DocuBank,
204.
that serve as
Living Will Registry, MedicAlert Foundation, and MyDirective as registries
alternatives to state-maintained registries).
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Healthcare providers have limited time to care for seriously ill individuals and
do not have time to "check the top five directories" in search of the
individual's advance directive.o5 Once the correct registry is located,
healthcare providers do not have time to click through multiple tabs within a
single registry to fish for relevant instruments.2o6 In all likelihood, a healthcare
provider will look in one online location and then return to the default
position-medical treatment. 20 7 Unless the registry is easily discovered and
easily used, healthcare providers are unlikely to consult them for the purpose
they are intended to serve,2os which threatens to frustrate a declarant's endof-life plan.
To counter the problems of consulting numerous registries with an
equivalent number of interfaces, a nationwide advance directory could be
built and maintained at the federal level. In fact, Congress has considered bills
that required a governmental study of the costs and benefits of creating a
national database. A section of a bill entitled The Advance Directives
Improvement and Education Act of 2004
directed the Comptroller General
to "conduct a study on the feasibility of a national registry for advance
directives."209 The Senate referred the bill to the Senate Finance Committee,
but it took no further action.2o Failing to take action on the bill during the
prior 2004 legislative session, the next Congress put another bill that required
an identical study on its legislative agenda, but it too went nowhere. ' Four
years later, the Senate again considered a bill, the Advance Planning and
Compassionate Care Act of 2oo9, that mandated an identical feasibility study
and, again, the bill failed to get out of the Senate Finance Committee.2 z And,

205.
Shefali Luthra, Advance Directives: Patients'End-Of-LifePlansOften Lost at CriticalMoments,
HARTFORD COURANT (April 12, 2016), http://www.courant.com/consumer/hc-Is-health-end-oflife-records-0 4 03 -2o0 60403-story.html.
206.

Id.

207.

Id.

208.
Id. (citing a senior Blue Shield of California manager for the proposition that registries
will be underutilized unless easy to use).
2og.
Advance Directives Improvement and Education Act of 2004, S.2545, io8th
Cong.

§ 6(c)

2io.

(2004)-

Id.

Advance Directives Education Act of 2005, S- 570, 1 o th Cong. (2005); All Actions S.
9
570 - 0l9th Congress (2005-2oo6), CONGRESS.GOv, https://www.congress.gov/bill/logth-ongress
/senate-bill/57o/all-actions?q=% 7 B% 2search%22% A% B%22% C%22advance+directive
2
3
5
5
211.

+registry%5C%22%22% 5 D% 7 D(last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (listing the bill's legislative action).
212.
Advance Planning and Compassionate CareActof 2o9, S. 1150, 11 ith Cong. (2009);

AllActionsS. I'50- iijth Congras (2009-20oo), CONGRESS.COV., https://www.congress.gov/bill/
iii th-congress/senate-bill/ i 50/all-actions?q=% B%22search%22% A%
7
3
5 B%22% 5 C%22
advance++directive+registry% 5 C% 2 2%2 2 % D% D (last visited Feb. 23, 2019)
(detailing the
5
7
bill's legislative trek). The House of Representatives considered the same bill. Advance
Planning

and Compassionate Care Act of 2oog, H.R.

291 1, 1 11th Cong. (2009). The House bill wound its
way through committees and subcommittees, but it met the same fate as its Senate
counterpart.
All Actions HR 2911 - iith
Congress (2009-2010), CONGRESS.Cov, https://www.congress.gov/
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the story is the same during the most recent sessions of Congress: introduction
of a bill that includes a mandated study and subsequent death in
the
committee.2'3 Apparently implementing legislation that, in part, requires
advance
of
registry
national
a
of
government to investigate the feasibility
directives is a Sisyphean task.
Whatever circumstances caused Congress to punt meaningful
consideration of a national advance directive registry over the past dozen
an
years, demographic inertia makes finding an efficient means of accessing
Baby
The
concern.
pressing
imminent
an
directive
advance
individual's
Boomer generation will soon confront healthcare issues associated with the
of
aging process in unprecedented numbers. More specifically, the number
of
rate
staggering
a
at
occurring
is
years
65
of
age
individuals who reach the
2
By
1
years.
12
next
the
for
1o,ooo persons per day and will do so each day
of age and older is a
2025, the number of people projected to be 65 years
little over 65 million, which exceeds the 2015 number by approximately 20
million people.2's Although the overwhelming majority of the 65 years and
6
older cohort state a preference to die at home, 2 data compiled by the
of
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shows that almost two-thirds
the
short,
In
7
home.
nursing
a
in
or
hospital
a
in
die
will
those individuals
in a healthcare
population is aging and the majority of those people will die
to an advance
access
ready
for
mechanism
facility. As a result, providing a
threatens to
so
do
to
failure
the
directive is a looming national issue, and
population.
the
of
subvert the autonomy of an enormous segment

bill/1 1 ith-congress/house-bill/291 i/allactions?q=% 7 B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22
advance+directive+registry%5C%2 2% 2 2 %5 D% 7 D (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
Advance Planning and Compassionate Care Act of 2014, S. 3009, i1 3 th Cong. (2014);
213.
All Actions S. 3009 - 11 3 th Congess (2013-2014), CONGRESS.cOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
113th-congress/senate-bill/3oog/all-actions?q=%7B%2 2search%22 % 3 A% 5 B%22% 5 C%22
2019) (listing the actions
advance+directive+registry%5C%22% 2 2 % 5 D% 7 D (last visited Feb. 23,
Actions Overview S.
(2016);
Cong.
I4th
296t,
S.
Act,
Care
Compassionate
on the bill); see also
i th2961 - 1r 4 th Congress (2015-206), CONGRESS.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/i 4
6
C%22advance+directive
B%22%
A%
5
i
/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%
5
3
congress/senate-bill/29
on the bill).
+registry% 5 C%22%22%5D%7D (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (overviewing actions
2010), http://
29,
(Dec.
CrR.
RESEARCH
PEW
Russell Heimlich, Baby Boomers Retire,
214.
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/20 o/1 2 / 2 9 /baby-boomers-retire.
(2012), https://
2012 National Population Projections Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
215.
(comparing
2-summary-tables.html
201
2/demo/popproj/
www.census.gov/data/tables/201
Table 2).
data for the 65 years of age and older cohort for the year 2015 to 2060 in
Where do Americans Die?, STANFORD SCHOOL OF MED., https://palliative.stanford.
2 16.
visited Feb. 23,
edu/home-hospice-home-care-of-the-dying-patient/where-do-americans-die (last
would prefer to die at home,
2019) ("Studies have shown that approximately 8o% of Americans
if possible.").
& HUMAN
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
217.
DEATH
ON
FEATURE
SPECIAL
WITH
2010:
STATES,
UNITED
HEALTH,
232,
SERVS., PUB. NO. 2011-1
(using data for
AND DYING 85 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/husio.pdf
decedents 65 years and over for the 2007 cohort).
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In addition to demographic data, federal expenditure on care for those
who have consciously chosen to forego treatment compels the construction
and maintenance of a national registry of advance directives. The increasing
cost of healthcare spending in the United States, particularly Medicare
spending, has been the subject of endless debate and concern for members
of the public and politicians alike.Is A massive 25% of all Medicare spending
to benefit the elderly is allocated to end-of-life care during the last year of
life.2'9 At the same time, empirical studies show an
increase in the
aggressiveness of treatments that are administered during the last 12 months
of an individual's life.22o As a result, much of this Medicare expenditure "goes
for care in [the] last couple of months that is of little apparent benefit."

For

those who have advance directives that are unavailable when needed, such
medical intervention not only has little medical benefit, but also exacts a
hidden toll by consuming scarce resources that could be used to promote the
self-determined choices of others. Failing to honor an individual's considered
choices because of a missing/misfiled advance directive or technical
operability problems externalizes costs throughout the system.
In contrast to the problems plaguing the existing array of storage
mechanisms, centralizing advance directives on a national level reduces the
transaction costs of locating a declarant's advance directive. The present mix
of state and private registries demands a search of multiple registries if the
declarant does not identify which registry houses the instrument.222 Locating
an advance directive in an online registry not only depends upon which
registry is searched, but also the identity of the searcher. Healthcare facilities
do not employ an "advance directive registry checker;" therefore, individual
knowledge of the storage options impacts the probability of location. The
online search could be performed by a physician, a hospice worker, or a
medical resident, and each may have different degrees of awareness about the
options available for storing advance directives. A registry that is centralized
218. Medicare, CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, https://www.cbo.gov/taxonomy/term/
1585/policyoptions (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (containing "Policy Options" tab which includes reports
about
the budgetary impact of Medicare).
219.
Gerald F. Riley &James D. Lubitz, Long-Term Trends in Medicare Payments in the Last Year
of Life, 45 HEALTH SERvs. RES. 565, 565-76 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/

articles/PMC28 3 816 1 /#b2 (noting that this figure represents a slight decline from prior results).
22o. Amber E. Barnato et al., Trends in Inpatient Treatment Intensity A nwng MedicareBeneficiaries
at the End of Life, 39 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 363, 363-75 (2004), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/

pubmed/1 5 0 3 2 9 5 9 (noting also that the frequency of aggressive treatment could have been
greater but for the increase in palliative care); see also Craig C. Earle et al., Trends in the
Aggressiveness of Cancer Care Near the End of Life, 22

J.

CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 315, 315 (2004),

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 8 8 61/#b
(concluding that "[t]he
2 3 1
7
treatment of cancer patients near death is becoming increasingly aggressive over time").
221.

See GAWANDE, supra note , at 153.
4

See Luthra, supra note 205 (quoting an advocacy group leader for the notion that it is
"really common" for healthcare professionals to fail to use an advance directive because it is
difficult to access).
222.
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on the national level, on the other hand, reduces the cost of locating a
declarant's advance directive by narrowing the search field to one regardless
of who is undertaking the search. Reducing transaction costs of location saves
time and energy in situations where those commodities are not likely to be
plentiful. Quicker identification of where an advance directive is stored
translates into quicker implementation of the declarant's wishes, which
reduces the harm stemming from undesired medical intervention.
A national online registry of advance directives not only decreases the
transaction costs of identifying which registry stores an instrument, but also
reduces the costs associated with functional usage of the registry. Whatever
the "top five directories" happen to be at any given time under the current
system, users probably do not interface with those directories in precisely the
same way. As a result, users must navigate registries with which they may be
unfamiliar in search of relevant instruments, which may again consume
valuable time. Storing advance directives in one online location, however,
reduces the time it takes to use the registry as users become accustomed to
the process of retrieving information from it over time. Simply put, users will
become familiar with how to use the registry and the process will be the same
for all searches undertaken within the registry; therefore, retrieving an
individual's advance directive becomes a more efficient process when
compared to present procedures.
To promote efficient retrieval of advance directives stored in a national
registry, two features are indispensable. As an initial matter, the national
registry must be searchable without reference to the access information
printed on a wallet card, bracelet, or a sticker. Although the privately-run U.S.
Living Will Registry permits healthcare providers to search the database using
identifiers such as the last four digits of an individual's Social Security
Number, 223 most registry searches require input from the declarant in the
form of file numbers and passwords.224 This mechanism of information

acquisition is largely indistinguishable from current practices that require
declarants to provide their advance directives to healthcare providers.225 And
as experience demonstrates, individuals frequently fail to provide advance
directives to healthcare providers because those instruments are not
physically present when needed or the declarant is unable to communicate.
Wallet cards and bracelets may modestly increase the probability that an
advance directive will be accessible at a critical time, but wallet cards and
bracelets will not always be available. As a result, healthcare professionals must

223.

U.S. Living Will Registry, How the Regisry Works, U.S. ADVANCE CARE PLAN REGISTRY,

24, 2019). This is not
http://www.uslivingwillregistry.com/howitworksind.shtm (last visited Feb.
AM. LIVING WILL
Quesions,
Asked
Frequently
See
uniformly the case among private registries.
Health Care
REGISTRY, http://www.alwr.com/page.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2019) ("The
files.").
your
access
to
card
ID
your
Provider will need the information on
224.
225.

See sufpra note 174 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.
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have the ability to search the national registry sans input from the declarant.
Failing to expand the ability to search a registry represents an unnecessary
risk to a declarant's interest in self-determination at a time when a declarant
is most vulnerable.
In addition to making the national registry searchable without declarant
input, the input/output interface must be accessible online. A number of
state-run and private databases already have online input/output online
mechanisms, but some registries require requests for advance directives to be
in writing or transfer information to healthcare professionals by non-webbased means,22 6 such as postal mail, email, or fax. Transmitting information
from an advance directive database to requesting healthcare professionals by
non-web-based mechanisms slows the acquisition of critical information when
time is of the essence. Indeed, examples of delayed delivery abound, and the
consequences can be deleterious for those receiving information in less than
a timely fashion.227 Furthermore, a postal mailing is not guaranteed to arrive
at its intended destination; mail can be lost or delivered to the wrong address.
Given that a ready alternative exists to non-web-based transfer, the failure to
permit online access with viewable online results again exposes informational
exchange to an unnecessary risk while a declarant's interest in selfdetermination hangs in the balance.
A national registry would not only lower location, search, and usage costs,
but also promises to require lower start-up costs when compared to the
monies expended on developing state or private registries. According to the
privately-operated U.S. Living Will Registry, a governmental registry is
disfavored because it will involve "start[ing] a new government bureaucracy,
with increased expense to taxpayers to plan, design and implement a storage
system, and then to pay personnel to run and maintain it.
As a theoretical
matter, the start-up and maintenance costs for a national registry could be
significant; however, the federal government has practical experience in
"228

226.
Presumably, these are the available options because the non-web-based mechanisms are
not
described.
See,
e.g., Frequently Asked
Questions, CAL.
SECRETARY
OF STATE,

http://www.sos.ca.gov/registries/advance-health-are-directive-registry/frequently-asked-questions
(last visited Feb. 24, 2019) (noting that "[a]ll requests for information must be in writing"); Mich.

Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Frequently Asked Questions, MIPEACEOFMIND,
https://www.mi

peaceofmind.org/FAQ.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2019) (noting that there is no electronic
access
to an advance directive, and healthcare providers may "request a copy of [an] advance
directive"
if they have access to such information).
227.

See, e.g., Liz Robbins, Post Office Fails to Deliveron Time, and DACA Applications Get
Rejected,

N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/20 7/11 / 1 o/nyregion/post-office-mail1

delays-daca-applications.html; 'No Mail Mondays:'Long-TimePostalService Complaints
Worsen During
Holidays, WRAL.COM (July 13, 2018), http://www.wral.com/-no-mail-mondays-long-time-postal-

service-complaints-worsen-during-busy-holiday-season/'7169253
(noting that delays involve
important bills that need to be paid).
228.
Government Involvement, U.S. LIVING WILL REGISTRY, availableat https://web.archive.org
/web/2010012 6 13472 6 /https://www.uslivingwillregistry.com/gov.shtm
(last visited Feb. 24,
2019) (adding that the government should utilize its service as a "Partner
of the Registry").
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running a national registry accessible by third parties when necessary. The
housed within
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, which is
a "national
maintains
Services,
Human
and
Health
the U.S. Department of
a donor
Once
transplant."229
a
for
waiting
database of all patients in the U.S.
a match
and
registry
the
into
organ is available, donor information is entered
dispatch
great
for the organ is found.23o The registry search must occur with
because organs can only live for so long outside of the body; therefore, time
is in short supply.23' Given its functionality, the national organ donation
Third
registry could be used as a model for an advance directive registry.
healthparties (healthcare providers) need ready access to an individual's
than
Rather
time-sensitive.
are
circumstances
the
and
related documentation
the
air,
thin
from
registry
national
a
create
to
incurring substantial expense
registry
similar
a
government's experience with building and operating
should reduce inception costs because pitfalls can be avoided. In short, a
national registry of advance directives need not be constructed from the
ground up-the theoretical and practical architecture is already in place.
C.

INCENTIvIZING REGISTRATION

Regardless of the ease with which a registry might be consulted, a registry
is inefficacious without declarant input. To that end, a primary challenge is
of
getting declarants to store advance directives in a registry upon inception
declarants
of
the registry. The scant available data reveals that low percentages
use an advance directive registry after it becomes operational. In California,
for example, a mere o.o6% of its population aged 65 years or older placed an
advance directive in the state's registry following its creation in 1995.232
Montana had the highest frequency of registration upon inception of its
registry with 6.23% of its 65 years and older population uploading advance
directives to the registry.233 The reported data is imprecise in that the best
figure to gauge the efficacy of registries is not represented by the percentage
of registrants out of the total population of the 65 years and older cohort.
Instead, a better metric would be the quotient yielded by dividing the number

229.

U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The Deceased Donation Process, ORGANDONOR.GOV,

(last visited Feb.
https://organdonor.gov/about/process/deceased-donation.html#matching
government,
federal
the
within
relationship
organizational
the
of
description
a
24, 2019). For

Network Policies
see U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Organ Procurement and Transplantation
(last
and Reports, ORGANDONOR.GOV, https://www.organdonor.gov/about-dot/laws/optn.html

visited Feb.
230.

231.

24, 2019).

note 229.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The Deceased Donation Process, supra
ORGANDONOR.GOV,
Recipients,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., MatchingDonorsand

24, 2019).
https://www.organdonor.gov/about/process/matching.html (last visited Feb.
31 BIFOCAL
Assessment,
and
Survey
A
Registries:
Directive
Advance
State
Allison Hughes,
232.
42 (2009).

233.

Id.

23,
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of individuals who have entered an advance directive by the total number of
individuals who have executed advance directives.234
Numerous reasons might explain the low frequency of registrations, 3s
but the consistent underutilization of available registries suggests that a
disconnect exists between the execution of estate planning documents and
storage options. Although most Americans die intestate,'236 empirical evidence
shows that the rate of testation increases with age.2 37 Similarly, the frequency
of advance directive execution also increases with age. One study of nearly
8,ooo participants, for example, found that 11.8% of 18-34y participants,
19.2% of 35-54y participants, 29.3% of 55-65y participants, and 51.2% of
those surveyed who were 6 5y or older had executed advance directives.238
Both wills and advance directives have long been deemed essential for
comprehensive estate planning.239 And as a practical matter, both instruments
are likely to be executed during the same attorney-supervised execution
ceremony given the statutory signature and witnesses requirements.
Following an attorney-supervised execution ceremony, a practical issue
immediately confronts all declarants/testators: where to keep the newly
234.

The total number of individuals who execute advance directives, of course,
is a number

that is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.
235.

For example, ignorance regarding the existence of an online registry or forgetfulness

may each play a role in the failure to submit an advance directive for registration.
236.
Rocket Lawyer, Rocket Lawyer's Annual Make-a-Will-Month Survey Reveals Strong Need
to
Educate Consumers on Estate Planning, MARKETWIRED
(Aug. 2,
2016, 8:oo AM),
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/rocket-lawyers-annual-make-will-month-surve-revealsstrong-need-educate-consumers-on-21
4 7 117.htm (reporting that 64% of participants did not have

a will).
237.

Linda Lyons, Last Wishes: Half ofAmericans Have Written Wills: Most Don't Have Living Wills,
(June 7, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ ' 6 6 6 o/Last-Wishes-Half-AmericansWritten-Wills.aspx (reporting "that older Americans are far more likely than younger
Americans
to have a will" and that 71% of those surveyed over age 5o had a will).
238. Jaya K Rao et al., Completion of Advance Directives Among US. Consumers, 46 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 65, 66, 69 (2014) (also finding that lack of awareness was the
most common
reason for not executing an advance directive).
239.
See, e.g., Michael Chamberlain, 5 Key Estate Planning Documents to Help Avoid Family
Conflicts, FORBEs (Oct. 21, 2011, 3:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/feeonlyplanner/
201/10/21/5-key-estate-planning-documents-to-help-avoid-family-conflicts; EstatePlanning:
The
Basics, WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, https://www.wellsfargoadvisors.com/planning/goals/estateplanning/basics.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). For planning suggestions that incorporate
both
wills and advance directives, see, e.g., Jane Bryant Quinn, Making Sound End-of-Life
Decisions,
AARP,
https://www.aarp.org/money/investing/info-20 5/end-of-life-decisions.html
(last
visited Feb. 24, 2019) ("When you make a regular will for your heirs, your attorney may
provide
his or her own versions of a living will or health care proxy. Modify them to
suit your situation,
then sign."); Susan Fox Buchanan &James W. Buchanan, III, Strategiesfor Clients
in Nursing Homes,
2o EST. PLAN. i, 6 -9 (1993); Jim Ludwick, Do I Need a Will? What to Know About Estate
Planning,
USATODAY (May 25, 2017,4:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/
6
6
201 /04/2 /nerdwallet-wills-estate-planning/8
3 5 5 2 79 2 ; What is the Difference Between a Will and a
Living Will, EDWARDS ELDER LAw, P.A. (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:05 PM), http://www.edwardselder
law.com/Blog/2o1 2/January/What-is-the-Difference-Between-a-Will-and-a-Livi.aspx
(noting the
prudence of having both instruments).
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minted instruments so that they are available at the appropriate time.24o Some
declarants/testators choose to depart an execution ceremony with their estate
important
planning documents in hand and store them wherever other
estate
their
keep
clients
that
suggest
even
documents are kept. Some attorneys
safe
a
on
money
save
to
home
planning instruments in their freezers at
deposit box while adding a measure of protection against destruction by
fire.24 Although the price of self-storage might be right, the risks of selfstorage are self-evident. Handwritten additions, cross-outs, and tears that
touch some portion of the written language may lead to questions about the
validity of those alterations or the instrument as a whole.242 More
fundamentally, the instruments may be placed in a location that is unknown
to anyone but the declarant/testator and thus be unavailable when needed.
In In re Estate of Fuchs, for example, an individual executed a will, but left
documents "lying about his houses or piled in his cars."24s Three years after
the individual's death, the decedent's family received an envelope containing
the decedent's will and thereafter offered it for probate.244 The court,
however, did not admit the newly discovered instrument to probate and the
decedent's estate descended by intestate succession.45 Whether an advance
directive or a will, the failure to have an instrument available when needed
threatens to waste the time and money spent on end-of-life planning.
Instead of storing estate planning documents in freezers or cars, some
declarants/testators opt to leave advance directives or wills with an attorney
for safekeeping. The wisdom of leaving important instruments with an
6
attorney is subject to varying opinions,24 but the practice is generally
client
permissible from an ethical perspective.247 If an attorney retains
Duty?: A CloserLook at
See generallyJennifer A. Kosteva, Where There's a Will, There's a. ..
LLP (2009),
WOODS
McGUIRE
Documents,
the Safekeeping of Clients' Original Estate Planning
/april/te_k
9
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/rpte-ereport/2oo
estate planning
osteva.authcheckdam.pdf (listing various storage options for an individual's
documents).
Where's the Best Place to Store a Will?, A.B.A.: SOLOSEZ, https://www.americanbar.org/
241.
(last visited
content/dam/aba/publications/solosez/storewills_2oo5_11.authcheckdam.pdf
240.

Feb.

24, 2019).

1995) (noting
See, e.g., In re Estate of Funk, 654 N.E.2d 1174, 1176-77 (Ind. Ct. App.
of the will).
page
a
of
reattachment
and
removal
as
well
as
hand
by
will
the
to
alterations
numerous
2017).
(Neb.
goo
896,
N.W.2d
goo
Fuchs,
of
Estate
re
In
243.
242.

Id.
filed for an intestate
Id. at goo, go6 (explaining that two of decedent's children had
245.
the newly discovered will was
proceeding and been appointed as administrators at the time that
submitted for probate).
Your Will in the Lawyer's Office,
CompareAbraham Shalo, Letter to the Editor, Don't Keep
246.
/o8/opinion/1-don-t-keep-your/o
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1g8 9 4
I448 .html, wvithJohn W. Callinan, Where Do I Store My Will, LAw OFFS.
244.

will-in-the-lawyer-s-office-3

9

/where-

JOHN W. CALLINAN (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.eldercarelawyer.com/blog/2012/11
do-i-store-my-will.
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL
247. THE AM. COLL. OF TRs. & ESTATE COUNSEL, ACTEC
an attorney "who has drawn
that
(stating
2016)
ed.
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(
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property for safekeeping, the instrument should be considered client
property and subject to the requirements of Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Specifically, Model Rule 1.15 specifies that "[a] lawyer should hold
property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary." 18
Although Rule 1.15 does not define "property," the rule differentiates
between client property in the form of "funds" and "other property" for
safeguarding purposes. 249 Seeking to clarify what constitutes "property" for
purposes of Rule

1. 15, an American Bar Association Formal Opinion

concluded that the phrase "may be fairly understood to include ... wills
. .. and ... any documents provided to a lawyer by a client."25o Offering
further illumination, the comments on the Washington Rules of Professional
Conduct state that its safeguarding rule applies to "original documents
affecting legal rights such as wills or deeds."25 Thus, an attorney who retains
advance directives and wills must safeguard the instruments and the failure to
satisfy the safeguarding obligation exposes an attorney to professional
discipline.
Within the context of retaining estate planning documents, safeguarding
a will should not be understood to be the same as safeguarding an advance
directive. A will, of course, is inoperative until the death of the testator;
therefore, third parties do not need access to the document before the
testator's death. Preservation of a will by storing it in a secure location satisfies
the needs of the client and third parties with interests under the will. An
advance directive, on the other hand, is needed before the declarant's death
to inform third parties of the declarant's end-of-life choices. As a result,
preserving an advance directive and a will in the same secure location may not
serve the needs of the client. If both instruments are stored, for example, in a
safe deposit box, neither instrument may be accessible until after the
individual's death. Post-mortem access of a will does not affect its utility, but
post-mortem discovery of an advance directive eliminates its utility. Thus, the
differing times at which each instrument must be available to preserve
functionality suggests that advance directives and wills should be stored
independently of one another.
To satisfy the duty to safeguard client property in the form an advance
directive, an attorney could register the instrument in the proposed national
registry of advance directives. Attorney registration of an advance directive in
a will or other estate planning documents for a client may offer to retain the executed
originals
of the documents subject to the client's instructions").
248. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1. 15 cmt. [I] (AM. BAR ASS'N 20 16).
249. Id. at (a) (stating that "[flunds shall be kept in a separate account" while "other property
shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded").
250. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 15-471 (2015).
251.
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 A cmt. [51,
WASH. COURTS,
5
https://www.courts.wa.gov/court rules/?fa=court rules.display&group=ga&set=-RPC&ruleid=ga
rpc I I5a (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
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the system not only preserves the instrument, but also increases the
time.252
probability that the instrument will be accessible at the appropriate
added
the
attorneys,
on
While registration may seem to increase the burden
obligations
registration obligation is no different than other professional

mandates that
imposed under Model Rule 1.15. Indeed, Model Rule 1.15(a)

where the
"[f]unds" must be held "in a separate account ... in the state
open and
lawyer's office is situated," which hypothesizes that an attorney2 must
3
an
Similarly,
5
money.
client's
a
hold
to
maintain an institutional account
that
expenses
and
fees
legal
account
trust
attorney must "deposit into a client
have been paid in advance" under Model Rule 1.1 5 (c) .254 Whatever added
burden is imposed by the requirement to create separate accounts for client
easier
property, the advent of the digital era makes safeguarding documents
2 5 An instrument may be stored on a USB drive
than it has been in the past. 5
on a portable
or uploaded to an online database. Storing an advance directive
available for
instrument
the
making
of
short
falls
device, however,
the proposed
on
directive
advance
an
consultation in an instant. Registering
makes the
hand,
other
the
on
directives,
national registry of advance
preserve
to
obligation
the
fulfilling
instrument accessible as needed while
client property enumerated in the Model Rules.25

6

The duty to safeguard an advance directive retained by an attorney not
for
only incentivizes registration, but also confronts a persistent problem
to
fails
existing registries-low numbers of registrations. An attorney who
register a retained advance directive risks professional discipline for violating
the duty to safeguard client property, which provides a substantial incentive
to comply.257 Although a declarant cannot be forced to leave a newly executed
advance directive with an attorney, many attorneys retain estate planning
advance
documents as a matter of course.258 If the attorneys who retain

directives satisfy the duty to safeguard client property by registering the
instruments with the proposed registry, the number of registrants is likely to
increase compared to the numbers associated with other registries at
inception. As registrations increase, awareness of the registry increases, which,
in turn, increases the likelihood of future registrations. In short, the duty to
a
safeguard client property-backed by professional sanctions-initiates
the "appropriate time" to
Given that many people change their end-of-life preferences,
A national registry will
life.
one's
of
end
the
before
well
be
often
will
directive
access an advance
change.
make it easier for declarants to access and modify their advance directives if their wishes
1.15(a).
r.
CONDUcr
253. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
252.

254.
255.

Id. r.

1.15(c).

Ethics of Attorneys, 8o FLA.
James Keim, Law Office Disaster Preparedness:The Liability and

ever to safeguard client files
B.J. 26, 30 (2oo6) (stating that "technology has made it easier than
and work product").
256. Assuming the availability of an online access point.
attorney showing due
257. As evidence of compliance, a document could be delivered to the
registration and that document could be placed in the client's file.
258.

See ABA COMM'N ON IAw & AGING, supranote 194.
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positive feedback loop that immunizes the proposed registry against the
threat of underutilization while promoting long-term stability of the system.
The positive feedback cycle of execution and registration also responds
to the philosophical criticism of advance directives based upon metaphysical
differences between the precedent and future self. While empirical results
show that individual preferences change over time thereby creating a schism
between precedent and future preferences, updating an advance directive
transforms what was once one's future self into the precedent self. But merely
updating an advance directive on paper may not lead to implementation of
the now precedent self's choices because those choices may not be available
when needed. Simply stated, updating an advance directive does not alter
practical impediments to accessibility attributable to declarants. As
a result,
the choices made by the now precedent self should be entered into the
national registry and available for consultation thereafter. Although
consultation may occur at a future time that is far removed from the time of
registry entry, the later executed advance directive remains closer in time to
the time of consultation when compared to the original advance directive.
And, some present indication of an individual's choices is better than no
indication whatsoever. Thus, allocating the burden of registry entry to an
attorney narrows the temporal gap between the metaphysical precedent self
and the future self; the future self is most metaphysically similar to the
precedent self who last updated the advance directive.
In addition to suffering disciplinary sanctions, a lawyer who fails to enter
an advance directive into a registry may be subject to a legal malpractice
action. As with other torts, a cause of action for legal malpractice generally
requires duty, breach, causation, and damages.259 Duty here arises from the
attorney-client relationship and is defined by the scope of the engagement.26 o
An attorney must "do all things reasonably necessary to fulfill the objective of
the employment," which can include "anticipating reasonably foreseeable
risks of harm."2 6

A client who engages a lawyer to prepare an advance

directive intends for the advance directive to be given effect. And a lawyer
preparing an advance directive can reasonably foresee that the advance
directive may not be given effect if it is not available to a healthcare

2594 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 33:2 (2017);
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS§ 30, 164-65 (W. Page. Keeton
ed., 5 th ed. 1984).

Some authority holds that legal malpractice is a contract claim, not a tort claim. O'Connell
v.
Bean, 556 S.E.2d 741, 743 (Va. 2002). The type of claim does not affect the analysis below, but
the characterization of the claim may impact other aspects of the case, like the statute
of
limitations and available damages. Id.
260.

i MALLEN, supra note 259,

261.

Id.

§ 8:5.
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provider.2 6 2 Registering the advance directive is therefore within the scope of
the attorney's engagement.263
Given the unambiguous duty to register an advance directive, the failure
to register in all but exceptional circumstances is a breach of that duty. A
lawyer may counter by arguing that other lawyers in her community do not
routinely register advance directives. Indeed, some courts have described the
standard of care as "that degree of care, skill, and diligence commonly

6
4
possessed and exercised by an ordinary member of the legal community."

The best reasoned judicial decisions, however, reject the notion that bad
customs immunize deficient attorney performance. In Gleason v. Title
Guarantee Co., for example, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
observed that "[n] o degree of antiquity can give sanction to a usage bad in
itself."2 65 As support for the notion that a history of bad practices does not
inoculate attorneys from liability, a leading treatise states that "although
custom may serve to explain or expand the skill or knowledge required, it
66
cannot and should not lower the standard of care."2 Thus, failing to register
an advance directive in a national registry would be a breach of an attorney's
duty to a client seeking to plan for end-of-life care.
Courts often find a breach of duty when an attorney fails to record a
6
transaction involving real property.2 7 In Reynolds v. Kadanoff & Haussman,
P.C, for example, the plaintiff purchased real property at a sheriffs sale, but

68
the plaintiffs attorney did not record the deed.2 The debtor subsequently

6
sold the property and that later deed was recorded.2 9 The court held that
these allegations stated a claim for legal malpractice.270 Recording a deed is
similar to registering an advance directive in the proposed registry because
both are designed to put third-parties on notice of a transaction. The purpose
of recording a deed is to inform buyers/third parties of interests that might
affect title to land while the purpose of registering an advance directive is to
inform healthcare professionals about the existence of an instrument that

262.

263.

264.
265.

See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
Absent an agreement to the contrary by the lawyer and client.

See, e.g., Cummings v. Donovan, 828 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (App. Div. 2007).
Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co., 300 F.2d 813, 814 ( 5 th Cir. 1962).
2 MALLEN, supra note 259, § 2o:8 (footnote omitted); see also Berman v. Rubin,

227
266.
has followed
S.E.2d 802, 8o6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) ("Of course, the fact that the defendant
customary procedures will not always insulate him from liability.").
267- 4 MALLEN, supra note 259, § 34:30; Benedict v. Estate of Noumair, 289 A.D.2d 71, 71
2001); Gold v. N.Y.
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Brown v. Walker, 555 S.E.2d 223, 224 (Ga. Ct. App.

&

State Bus. Grp. Inc., 255 A.D.2d 628, 630 (N.Y. App. Div.1 9 98); Reynolds v. Kadanoff
SO. 2d
Haussman, P.C., 248 A.D.2d 607, 6o8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Hundley v. Robinson, 569
8
199o).
App.
55, 5 (La. Ct.
268. Reynolds v. Kadanoff & Haussman P.C., 2 18 A.D.2d 732, 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
269. Id.
270.

Id. at 733.
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guides end-of-life care.2 71 When attorneys fail to take reasonable steps to
provide notice of an advance directive when the issue and consequences of
inaccessibility are foreseeable, they should answer to a claim of legal
malpractice.
The next element of legal malpractice, causation, presents a more
significant obstacle to liability when compared to the first two elements of a
claim. The client will have to establish that but for the attorney's failure to
register the advance directive, the advance directive would have been given
effect. 272 As discussed above, an abundance of evidence demonstrates that
healthcare providers often disregard instructions in advance directives even
when they are aware of them.273 Whether healthcare providers would have

complied with an advance directive in a particular case in which the advance
directive was not discovered because it was not entered into the registry will
be a factual question. A plaintiff could, for example, compare the provider's
actions to the policies and practices outlined in the material required to be
supplied to patients upon admission under the language of the Patient SelfDetermination Act ("PSDA")
A deviation between the facts and a facility's
written policies could, in part, lead a jury to conclude that the advance
directive would have been honored if it had been available to healthcare
providers. Although the causation element is a barrier to a legal malpractice
claim, the difficulty of proof should not serve to insulate attorneys from
liability when their omissions have foreseeably deleterious consequences.
If a client surmounts the obstacle created by the causation requirement,
then a plaintiff must specify the damages suffered as a result of the
defendant's conduct. In all likelihood, the damages resulting from the failure
to register an advance directive will be noneconomic in nature. Statutory law
often defines what is covered by the broad phrase "noneconomic damages,"
but, as a general matter, noneconomic damages are intended to compensate
.274

for intangible, nonpecuniary losses.275 The Florida Code, for example, defines

"[n] oneconomic damages" to "include [e] pain and suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for
enjoyment of life, and other nonfinancial losses to the extent the claimant is

271.
272.

26AC.J.S. Deeds § 159 (2o18); 66AM.JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws§ 6 (2019).
4
See Cummings v. Donovan, 36 A.D. 3 d 648, 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) ("A cause of action

to recover damages for legal malpractice requires proof ...
that, but for the defendant's
negligence, the plaintiff would have been successful in the underlying action.").
273. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
274.
204

Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101 -5o8, 104 Stat. 1388-1 15, 1388(1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 139 cc(f)(i)(A),
1395cc(f)(2),
5

1396a(w)(i)(A),

1396a(w)(2)

(2012)).

275.
See generally Harry Zavos, Monetary Damagesfor Nonmonetary Losses: An IntegratedAnswer to
the Problem of the Meaning Function, and Calculation of Noneconomic Damages, 43 LoY. L.A. L.
REv.
193 (2009)

reparation).

(arguing that noneconomic damages in tort suits serve more as a symbolic
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6
entitled to recover such damages under general law."27 Some authority states
that noneconomic damages are not allowed for legal malpractice claims.277
The bulk of authority, however, prohibits noneconomic damages only when
8
they are a consequence of other, economic, injuries.27 One court explained:
There are cases in which the original claim negligently handled by
the attorney will not be predicated upon an economic loss, such as
cases involving issues of contested child custody or visitation,
confinement to a mental hospital, imprisonment, adoption, etc. Not
to allow mental anguish damages under these limited circumstances
would leave such a client without a remedy and virtually immunize
the negligent attorney. This would certainly be contrary to public
interest and would not constitute sound public policy.279

Mental anguish damages are not premised on any economic injury;
therefore, non-economic damages are recoverable in a legal malpractice
action. Moreover, failing to permit an award of noneconomic damages in
these cases would effectively leave individuals without a remedy. After all, the
damages incurred are those associated with continued life following
unwanted medical intervention. Noneconomic damages defy exact
calculation because no objective measure can be utilized, but awards should
be "fair and just."2ao Although they may be criticized as arbitrary,281 awarding
noneconomic damages in legal malpractice cases involving an attorney's
failure to register an advance directive not only capture a portion of the harm
suffered by declarants, but also promotes the public interest by providing a
remedy for foreseeable harm.282

276. FLA. STAT. § 766.202(8) (201 1). For examples of other definitions of "noneconomic
IAws ANN.
damages," see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-16o1(5) (Supp. 2018); and MicHi. COMP.
§69 . 4 6(f) (West 2015)Smith v. McLaughlin, 769 S.E.2d 7, 20 (Va. 2015) ("A legal malpractice plaintiff may
277.
recover only pecuniary damages proximately caused by an attorney's breach of the contractually
implied duties.").
278. Gavend v. Malman, 946 P.2d 558, 563 (Colo. App. 1997).
Jarrell v. Miller, 882 So. 2d 639, 647 (La. Ct. App. 2004)279.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.o-52 (2017) (describing the amount of damages available).
280.
281. See Zavos, supra note 276, at 250-54 (cataloguing various comments regarding the
arbitrary nature of noneconomic damage awards).
Legal malpractice exposure might attach earlier during the representation if an
282.
attorney fails to advise an individual about advance directives. Indeed, a New Jersey court
would
explained that immunizing attorneys from liability for non-economic harm
rafting
"[d]
including
engagements,
of
variety
a
for
inappropriately leave clients without a remedy
a living will." Kohn v. Schiappa, 656 A.2d 1322, 1324 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995). Specifically,
failed to
a plaintiff in this context would have to prove (s) that her estate planning attorney
an
executed
have
would
she
that
(2)
process,
planning
the
during
directive
advance
an
suggest
of
aware
made
been
have
would
provider
healthcare
advance directive if informed, (3) that her
the advance directive, and (4) that because there was no advance directive (5) the healthcare
E.
provider administered unwanted life-saving treatment (6) that caused harm. I RONALD
Importantly, the fact that harm would not have
MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8:20 (2019).
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COMPENSATION FOR VIOLATIONS OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES

Although case and statutory law authorizes advance directives, awarding
damages based upon a novel claim of "wrongful living" is unlikely to gain
widespread acceptance in the near future. Existing common law principles,
however, may provide a mechanism to award damages that have the potential
to impact future behavior without wholesale acceptance of "wrongful living"
into the common law. As an initial option, a court could construe the violation
of an advance directive as a dignity tort and award damages based upon harm
to the dignity of declarants.283 Indeed, sizable dignity awards would, in theory,
promote greater compliance with advance directives. But given their rejection
of "wrongful living" as a viable theory, courts seem unlikely to broaden the
scope of dignity torts to include violations of advance directives.
Furthermore,
courts have largely failed to award dignity damages in analogous settings
involving informed consent, 8 4 which again does not augur well for dignity as
a basis for signaling damages in cases where an advance directive is violated.
occurred but for the healthcare provider's life-saving intervention does not preclude recovery

from the estate planning attorney. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. i (AM. LAWINST.

1977). To the contrary, the plaintiff can succeed by showing that care consistent with her wishes

(non-intervention) would have achieved her desired medical condition (death). RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (20 10).

Much of the factual support for such a claim is identical to that which supports a malpractice
claim for failure to use the proposed registry; therefore, we omit discussion in the body of the
paper to avoid repetition. However, the first three elements of the claim create evidentiary
challenges for plaintiffs. First, proving element (i) involves a post-hoc review of evidence that is
largely, if not entirely, within a defendant attorney's knowledge. To ameliorate the issue, the
burdens of production and persuasion for this element could be reallocated to the attorney.
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (shifting the burden to the
defendant in part because it "will be in a better position to develop any needed documentation");
Jody S. Kraus, Decoupling Saks Law from the Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, 104 YALE L.J. 129, 146
(1994) (stating that one "rationale for allocating burden of proof . .. is to provide the party best
able to create cost-effective evidence with the incentive to do so"). Second, element (2) requires
a plaintiff to show counter-factually that, if properly advised by the attorney, she would have
executed an advance directive refusing care. A plaintiff may offer evidence on this point. Such
testimony may be self-serving, but that goes to weight, not admissibility. See Connolly v. Smith,
No. 03-03-00 5 7 5 -CV, 200 4 WL 1898220, at*5 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004). Lastly, proving that
a healthcare provider would have known about the individual's advance directive might
stymie

many claims given the problem of inaccessibility. Nevertheless, a plaintiff might, for example,
submit hospital policies/protocols as evidence that the provider would have been aware of the
advance directive. The final elements are factually straightforward-the absence of an advance
directive led to unwanted medical intervention and associated harm.
283.
Calvert Magruder, Mental and EmotionalDisturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv.
1033, 1034 (1936).
284.
See E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on
a Learning Curve, 4 Hous.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 73-79 (2003) (arguing that courts
should

recognize dignitary harm for violations of informed consent in the context of medical research
in the form of "medical research battery" and "invasion of bodily integrity"). But see Lugenbuhl
v. Dowling, 701 So. 2d 447, 455-56 (La. 1997) (recognizing dignity harm for "disregard[ing]
the patient's expressed wishes" after a physician performed a medical procedure despite the
patient's objection).
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Thus, a more granular examination of claims within existing tort doctrine and
the associated harms suffered by declarants is necessary to increase the
probability of trial or settlement awards that realign the current incentive
structure.
Because courts routinely refuse to entertain lawsuits premised on
"wrongful living," plaintiffs have asserted a wide range of tort claims seeking
compensatory damages from responsible parties.85 For example, individuals
have filed claims based upon just about everything from traditional
intentional infliction of emotional distress to more attenuated claims
grounded upon §1983 and the False Claims Act.28(i One of the most
straightforward claims, however, asserts that defendants are liable for battery
after administering medical treatment in violation of an advance directive. A
person can be liable for battery if the person through intentional and nonconsensual affirmative conduct makes contact with another person that
causes bodily harm or is offensive.287 Presumably, a healthcare provider makes
some form of contact with the declarant, such as inserting tubes or moving
from one bed to another for treatment, and that contact is non-consensual
given the existence of a valid advance directive. Even if the touching does not
cause bodily harm, it is almost certainly "offensive" as an interference with
"autonomy, dignity, and freedom from emotional harm" as memorialized in
8
the advance directive.2 8
In addition to filing a complaint alleging that wrongful medical
intervention constitutes battery, a plaintiff may ground a complaint for
compensatory damages on the law of negligence. As a general matter, showing
that a healthcare provider is liable for negligence requires a showing that a
provider had a duty to adhere to an advance directive, a breach of that duty,
8
the plaintiff suffered damages, and that the breach caused the damage.2 9 The
choice between battery or negligence comes down to the presence or absence
of intent because negligence does not require a plaintiff to show that the
defendant's conduct was intentional. As a result, negligence is often the claim
of choice in cases where a healthcare provider was ignorant of the existence
of an advance directive.29o A plaintiff might assert that a healthcare provider
was negligent, for example, if the healthcare provider overlooked an advance
See Pope, supra note 43, at 260-61. Professional sanctions are also possible. If these
285.
sanctions were consistently imposed and serious enough, they could mitigate the need for more
expansive tort liability and the public law proposal set forth below. The problems with AD
are
completion and compliance outlined above suggest that current professional sanctions
insufficient.

286.

Id.

287.

RESTATEMENT (TI IRD) or TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

101
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§3

(AM.

IAw INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
Id. § ioi cmt. b.
288.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
289.
LAwINST. 2005).
See Pope, supra note 43, at 268.
29o.
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directive in a patient's medical record, treated the patient in violation of the
advance directive, and the patient suffered harm in form of prolonged life
because of the treatment. In reality, the risk of a claim of negligence in cases
involving violations of advance directives is likely to be inversely proportional
to the quality of medical record-keeping and the protocols by which those
records are consulted. Effective record-keeping and review practices decrease
the risk of negligence.
Interestingly, plaintiffs may opt to combine assertions of negligence and
battery to account for both intentional and unintentional wrongs when
seeking compensation for unwanted life-prolonging medical intervention. In
Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., for example, the Supreme Court of
Ohio considered battery and negligence claims asserted by an individual who
was resuscitated via defibrillation following an episode of ventricular
tachycardia despite an order not to do so.2 s Analyzing the negligence claim,
the court recited that an alleged cause is not a cause upon which
compensation is awarded "if the particular event would have occurred without
the doing of the act."292 In this case, the court concluded that the stroke was
a foreseeable occurrence after surviving heart problems and that no evidence
existed to show that the resuscitative efforts caused the stroke.293 And
although the court noted that a plaintiff could recover for battery, only
nominal damages could be granted if the battery was "physically harmless."294
The plaintiff did not suffer physical harm as a result of the defibrillation;
therefore, only nominal damages could be awarded.29s Soberly, the court
declared that "[t] here are some mistakes, indeed even breaches of duty or
technical assaults, that people make in this life that affect the lives of others
for which there simply should be no monetary compensation."29 6
Despite judicial non-recognition of "wrongful living" and the "nominal
damages" that may be granted to battery/negligence plaintiffs, a return to
first principles points the way to improved damage awards in cases involving
violations of advance directives. Whether "wrongful living," battery, or
negligence serves as the foundation of a plaintiffs complaint, the primary
damages claim will take the form of compensatory damages. The definition
varies, but compensatory damages generally represent the "actual damages

291.
Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio 1996).
The
patient suffered a stroke and became partially paralyzed following medical treatment.
Id. at 226.
The patient/original plaintiff died, and the administrator of plaintiff's estate pursued
the claim
on behalf of the decedent. Id.
292.

293.

Id. at 228.
Id.

294.
Id. at 229. The court's statement casts further doubt over the ability of dignity damages
to channel future behavior because damage to dignity is also "physically harmless;"
therefore, a
possibility exists that dignity damages will be insufficiently large to alter decision-making.
295.
Id. (noting that there were "no tissue burns or broken bones").
296.

Id. at 228.
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... awarded for the loss, injury, or deterioration to a person caused by the
for
negligence, design, or accident of another."297 Because they compensate
8
"actual damages," compensatory damages exclude punitive damages.29 Thus,

the fundamental goal of compensatory damages is to "put the plaintiff back
in the same position [he/she] was in prior to the occurrence in question so
that thereafter the plaintiff would be no richer and no poorer than" before
the act causing the harm.299

For plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages based upon a theory of
"wrongful living," the essence of the claim is that life following unwanted
medical intervention is an injury that merits compensation. In other words,
wrongful living plaintiffs seek damages for continued life, which is graphically
a
depicted in Figure 1. The solid horizontal line in Figure 1 represents
line
horizontal
the
bisects
plaintiffs qualify of life and the vertical line that
represents medical intervention that prolongs a plaintiffs life. By seeking
for
compensation for post-intervention life, plaintiffs seek a monetary award
area B in Figure 1. Courts have traditionally refused to recognize "wrongful
living" as a basis for compensation on the ground that life is always a benefit,
never an injury. As a general matter, then, plaintiffs asserting a wrongful living
claim do not receive any compensation for harm contained in area B
following medical intervention that prolongs life in violation of an advance
directive.

22 AM.JUR. 2D
17 FLA.JUR. 2D Damages § 7 (2018) (footnotes omitted); see aso, e.g.,
297.
loss that the
concrete
the
redress
to
intended
are
damages
Damages§ 24 (2018) ("Compensatory
to repair
plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct. Their objective is
actions,
tort
and
contract
both
In
another.
of
wrong
the
the damage caused to one party by
whole by
compensatory damages are awarded for the purpose of making the injured party
to the
reimbursing, compensating, or indemnifying him or her for the loss or harm suffered,
covers all loss
extent that it is possible to measure his or her injury in terms of money. The term
other than
recoverable as a matter of right and includes all damages (beyond nominal damages)
punitive or exemplary damages." (footnotes omitted)).
Leahy
298. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 2A AMERICAN LAw OF TORTS § 8:6o (Monique C.M.
has
them
seeking
party
the
unless
awarded
be
not
may
damages
"punitive
ed., 2018) (stating that
also,
see
action");
of
cause
sustained actual harm or damages sufficient to support an underlying
covers all loss recoverable
e.g., 22 AM.JUR. 21 Damages § 24 ("The term [compensatory damages]
as a matter of right and includes all damages ... other than punitive or exemplary damages.").
299.

8 AM.JUR. PLEADINGS & PRACTICE FORMS ANNOTATED Damages § 155

(20 18).
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Figure 1. Wrongful Living Damages from Wrongful Life-Saving Treatment
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In contrast to the failure to receive compensation in "wrongful living"
actions, some battery and negligence plaintiffs have received compensatory
damages after the administration of unwanted life-prolonging medical
treatment.300 A closer examination of the list of compensable harms, however,
reveals that the list is incomplete. Compensating plaintiffs for harms such as
"broken bones" and "mental anguish" is unquestionably appropriate for
claims of battery and negligence.so' And in addition to physical and mental
harms experienced by declarants whose advance directives are violated, courts
also award damages for out-of-pocket costs such as "medical expenses" or "the

300.
One commentator rejects compensatory damages altogether, arguing instead for no
recovery of subsequent medical expenses by the HCP. Kellen F. Rodriguez, Suing Health Care
Providersfor SavingLives: Liabilityfor Providing Unwanted Life-Sustaining Treatment, 2oJ. LEGAL MED.
1, 6 n.28 (1999).

301. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229
(Ohio 996)
(describing "tissue burns" and "broken bones" as examples of compensable damages); Anderson
v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-9 o8i 9, 1995 WL 109 128, at
*5 (Ohio Ct. App. March 15,
3
1995) (listing as compensable damages "medical expenses," "the costs of the nursing home," "any
extraordinary expenses," and "pain, suffering and emotional distress"),
rev'd, Anderson, 671
N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996); see also Pope, supra note 43, at 265 (describing 1996 case in which jury
awarded $16.5 million in damages for pain and suffering for "the patient's
pain and suffering,
the mother's mental anguish, a sister's mental anguish, and future medical expenses").
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costs of the nursing home" associated with wrongful medical intervention.3o2
But one harm is generally absent from most enumerations of compensable
harms associated with a violation of an advance directive-loss of enjoyment
of life. In fact, damages for diminished enjoyment of life have rarely been
mentioned in cases where life is prolonged after violating an advance directive
or any of the literature exploring the topic.3o3
The frequent absence of loss of enjoyment of life damages from the list
of compensable harms is striking because an award of damages for loss of
enjoyment of life is inherent in the harm suffered by declarants.o4 Numerous
studies have found that individuals who receive medical attention under dire
health circumstances may not recover a suitable quality of life. A 2004 study,
for example, found that only one in four patients who was intubated for stroke
recovered good function and quality of life.3s Similarly, an earlier
investigation concluded that:

Patients who have recovered from circulatory arrest in an ICU
environment after CPR find their capacity for resuming work
diminished after discharge from the hospital and experience a
postponed negative effect on their mental functioning, especially
those functions that are related to their awareness of the
6
environment.o

Anderson, 19 9 5 WL 09I28, at*5.

302.

case in which the plaintiffs
But cf Pope, supra note 43, at 266 (describing a Louisiana
care,
sought damages for "the medical expenses attributable to [the patient's] post-resuscitation
decline").
cognitive
and
life,
of
enjoyment
of
loss
suffering,
and
physical and mental pain
303.

304.
Stroke,

31

for Life-Threatening
E.g., Stephan A. Mayer et al., Cost and Outcome of Mechanical Ventilation
who had received
STROKE 2346, 2349 (2000) (finding that half of six-month survivors

A more
mechanical ventilation for stroke "were severely disabled and completely dependent").
recent review paints a rosier picture:
One study showed that all successfully resuscitated patients (7 out of 41) of 70 years
and older enjoyed a level of independence similar to their level before the
resuscitation, measured i month after the resuscitation. Another study with 42
successfully resuscitated patients (54% of total) of 70 years and older also found that
there were no significant differences in the functional level of the survivors at the
time of hospital discharge compared with their pre-arrest status.

After In-Hospital
Myke S. van Gijn et al., The Chance of Survival and the Functional Outcome
Cardiopulnonary Resuscitation in Older People: A Systematic Review, 43 AGE & AGEING 456, 460 (2014)
over
omitted). However, the same review included a third study of 24 CPR survivors

(footnotes
8o, in which only 20% "were capable of independent functioning outside of institutionalised
factors
care." Id. And it must be noted that quality and enjoyment of life depend on many more
than just independent functioning. Still, the review article suggests that life-saving interventions
reduce
and post-intervention care have improved in recent years. Id. at 46 1-62. While that would
the amount of recovery, it does not affect the calculations or underlying principles.

Ventilation in Elderly
C. Foerch et al., Survival and Quality of Life Outcome After Mechanical
305.
Stroke Patients, 75 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY, & PSYCHIATRY 988, g88 (2004)CHEST 524,
306. Dinis Reis Miranda, Quality of Life After CardiopulmonaryResuscitation, 1o6
529

(Aug. 1994).
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Furthermore, palliative care studies demonstrate that such care does not
accelerate "death, but often prolongs life with better quality."o7 Given such

results, declarants whose end-of-life wishes are violated experience a
diminution in the enjoyment of life-and that harm is largely unrecognized
and almost always uncompensated.
Fundamentally, failing to identify the loss of enjoyment in life as a
cognizable harm in battery and negligence claims associated with violating an
advance directive ignores the core decision declarants make in advance
directives-choosing to end life rather than prolong it in an unwanted
condition. Damage awards that include pain and suffering compensate for
failing to honor a declarant's wishes for comfort care only, but do not address
the harm from continuing to live in a state that the declarant finds
unacceptable. People may not want to remain alive if it means being unable
to speak, eat by mouth, and being alone with only "the rhythmic sounds of [a]
breathing machine providing the new soundtrack to . .. life."so 8 Indeed, some
individuals witness the "bad" deaths of friends or relatives and make a
conscious decision to avoid living under such circumstances by executing an
advance directive that prohibits such a death.o9 For declarants, medical
intervention only prolongs death;3mo remaining alive after unwanted medical
intervention is not equivalent to living.
Formally, Figure 2 presents a more nuanced view of the damages suffered
by declarants following the prolongation of life in violation of an advance
directive. The horizontal line represents quality of life, which drops
precipitously in the moments before wrongful intervention. Because
intervention is successful, quality of life rises from this nadir. The exact
trajectory of improvement will vary widely. Figure 2 assumes a steep initial
recovery, followed by a gradual and marginally diminishing improvement. In
Figure 2, then, enjoyment of life damages equal the difference between preintervention quality of life and post-intervention quality of life (area A in
Figure 2). As a doctrinal matter, damages for loss of enjoyment of life are
traditionally limited to nonpecuniary harms, such as humiliation, fear and
anxiety, loss of companionship, and loss of freedom.31 Each of these area A
harms is readily identifiable as a consequence of violating an advance
directive.3z Furthermore, these nonpecuniary harms are not necessarily

307. Jeremy Topin, The 'Good'Deaih that Could Have Been Much Better, STAT
(May 31, 2017),
https://www.statnews.com/2o 7/05/31 /end-of-life-death-icu.

3o8.

See ZrrrER, supra note 6, at 148.

309.

Id. at 121.

310.

See Topin, supra note 307.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTs

31 1.

§ 905

(AM. LAW INST. 1979).

At least one court ruled out humiliation damages where there is no contemporaneous
witness. Porter v. Children's Health Care-Minneapolis, No. C 5 9 8-i 3 4 2 , 1999 WL 71470, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. i6, 1999) ("If he suffers from humiliation
and embarrassment, his
312.
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included in battery and negligence compensatory awards. The damages that
result from non-consensual touching or a breach of duty may not capture the
fear and humiliation of losing meaningful contact with the world while being
"stuck in a ventilator facility forever."'s3
Figure

Enjoyment of Life Damages from Wrongful Life-Saving Treatment
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Enjoyment of life damages are distinct from the "wrongful living" damages
of life
long debated in the literature (area B in Figures i and 2).3 ' Enjoyment
living"
"wrongful
value;
damages assume that continued life has positive
damages assume that continued life has negative value, which is one reason
courts reject them.s'5 In other words, "wrongful living" damages assume life
itself is an injury, and courts reject the notion that continued life is harmful.
Conversely, loss of enjoyment of life damages assume only that a good life is
better than a bad life. The assumption that even unwanted life has value
implicitly carries over into all categories of damages in wrongful prolongation
of life cases. For example, assume the horizontal line represents baseline pain
a consequence of the
condition is a result of a subsequent telling of a version of the facts and not
incident itself.").
313.

314.

See ZrTIER, supra note 6, at 125.

of these damages); and
The seminal articles are Oddi, supranote 36 (arguing on behalf

"Wrongful Living" Cause of
Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead Than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a
L. REV. 149, 227-28
Action When Doctors Fail to HonorPatients'AdvanceDirectives?,54 WASH. & LEE

recent article, see Sawicki, supra
(1997) (disputing the legitimacy of these damages). For a more
note 4o, at 293.
rejected "wrongful living"
Pope, supra note 43, at 256 (explaining that some courts have
315.
In other words, area B in
harm").
not
benefit,
a
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life
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damages
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and suffering (or absence thereof). 36 The acute event depictedjust to the left
of the wrongful intervention generates extreme discomfort. After
intervention, the patient experiences continued pain and suffering (though
perhaps not indefinitely, which Figure 2 assumes).
One reason courts reject "wrongful living" as a theory for recovery is that
the damages are not measurable.3Q To that end, the same criticism could be
aimed at damage awards based upon the loss of enjoyment of life after
unwanted medical intervention. Although no objective measure can place a
dollar value on the loss of enjoyment of life, tort law routinely quantifies the
difference between two states of well-being: the pre-accident level and the postaccident level. Quantification is not easy, but it is unavoidable in cases that
juxtapose unambiguous harm with an ambiguous compensation calculation.
Nevertheless, courts, juries, and industries place dollar values on lost limbs as
well as other intangible harms. Courts and juries, for example, have awarded
monetary damages for lost legs and toes while worker's compensation plans
place the average value of a lost arm at $169,878.3,8 In short, the difficulties
of quantification are no greater for the enjoyment of life damages outlined
here than they are for much of tort law generally.3'9 And more importantly in
this context, failure to quantify such damages is unfair to declarants and sets
the wrong incentives for the future.
While Figure 2 depicts the loss of enjoyment of life damages available to
compensate declarants following violations of advance directives, the next
figure, Figure 3, illustrates counterarguments available to defendants seeking
to reduce those damages. Assuming that baseline quality of life would have
remained constant but for the acute event (the horizontal dotted line in
Figure 3), a defendant can show contributory negligence that justifies a
reallocation of responsibility and concomitant reduction in the damage
award.32o Specifically, a defendant has two options to show how the plaintiffs

316.
Pain and suffering could be filed under enjoyment of life, but they are generally
classified instead as a separate variety of bodily harm. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 905
cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
317.
Pope, supra note 43, at 256 ("Second, even if wrongful prolongation were a legally
cognizable injury, it is incapable of quantification.").
318. Lena Groeger et al., Workers' Comp Benefits: How Much is a Limb Worth?, PROPUBLICA (Mar.
5,
2015),
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/workers-compensation-benefits-by-limb;
Ronald V. Miller, Jr., Settlement Value of an Amputated Toe, MD. INJ. LAw. BLOG
(June 3, 2016),
https://www.marylandinjurylawyerblog.com/value of an-amputated-toe.html
(including
descriptions of awards for lost toes and one case involving a lost leg).
319.
This is true even though diminished enjoyment of life may extend into the future.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. i ("The length of time during which pain
or other
harm to the feelings has been or probably will be experienced and the intensity of the
distress are
factors to be considered in assessing the amount of damages." (emphasis added)).
320. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injuy Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequenxs, go YALE L.J. 1353, 1393 (198 1)
("If a defendant
seeks to reduce his liability by asserting that part of the harm is not attributable
to his tortious
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conduct contributed to the harm. First, a defendant might offer proof that
the plaintiff was negligent in delaying medical treatment and earlier medical
care could have prevented the acute event. Second, a defendant could reduce
the damage award by showing that the plaintiffs baseline quality of life was
declining before the acute event and the decline was likely to continue
dotted
(Figure 3). Graphically, this is represented by the downward sloping
line in Figure 3. Evidence showing either a plaintiffs delay in seeking
treatment or a progressive decline in health rebuts the presumption that an
individual's life would have approached the pre-intervention quality of life
represented by the dashed horizontal line in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Enjoyment of Life Damages from Wrongful Life-Saving Treatment
in Declining Patient
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The areas in Figure 3 above the dotted line with a negative slope (areas C and
D) would not be compensable. Indeed, area D represents a windfall and could
offset the damages defined by area A. The burden to show declining health
should be placed on the defendant, and if the defendant fails to meet this
burden, the damage award would be areas A plus C.32

and
conduct, the burden of proving both that the plaintiffs injury is capable of apportionment
defendant.").
the
on
rest
what the apportionment should be should
321.

Id.; cf Peters, supra note 17, at 700-01

(advocating that the burden be shifted to the

defendant to prove the benefits of continued life). The approach taken by Peters, unlike ours,
does not avoid the need to put a value on continued life (area B in Figure i).
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An additional counterargument to imposing damages for loss of
enjoyment of life following unwanted medical intervention is that the
defendant is being held liable for damages that were caused by the acute
event, not by the intervention. Focusing on the acute event as the cause of
harm, however, misconceives the nature of the claim. First, the acute
event,
by precipitating death, would actually have eliminated, not caused, postintervention damages. The intervention alone is responsible for the
experience of diminished quality of life after the intervention. Furthermore,
the acute event is not sufficiently "attached" to the plaintiff to reduce
damages.3s2 In other words, the plaintiffs damages were entirely avoidable
until the defendant intervened. Thus, the violation of the advance directive
-not the precedent acute health crisis-caused the loss of
enjoyment of life
for which compensatory damages should be granted.323
V.

CONCLUSION

Although judicial decisions and statutes have recognized advance
directives for over 40 years, the law has failed to generate an adequate
response to well-known accessibility and compliance problems. One basic
reason for the law's passive response to the practical problem of accessibility,
as well as its failure to compensate for wrongful prolongation of life, is the
disparate interests of attorneys, healthcare professionals, and patients. Under
the present legal construct, attorneys and healthcare professionals benefit by
having limited liability exposure. Given their common interest in decreasing
the potential for liability, attorneys and healthcare professionals form a singleissue interest group with little incentive to push for change. On the other
hand, patients/declarants simply want to have their advance directives given
effect but consist of a widely dispersed group of individuals without a
meaningful ability to form a powerful and cohesive interest group. Given the
singularity on one side of the equation and the scatter on the other side of
the equation, the law remains static, and the legal protection of selfdetermination at the end-of-life remains inchoate.
In addition to addressing the practical and legal problems that impede
compliance with advance directives, creating a national advance directive
registry and expanding tort liability recalibrates the balance of interests
between individuals and attorneys and healthcare providers. The basic
interest of declarants in having their advance directives honored is

322.
King, supra note 320, at 1357 ("Generally, a preexisting condition may be defined as a
disease, condition, or force that has become sufficiently associated with the victim to be factored
into the value of the interest destroyed, and that has become so before the defendant's conduct
has reached a similar stage.").

323. See Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Damages for pain,
suffering, 'psychological problems' and the like, however, may of course be recovered only
to the
extent that [the plaintiff] proves they were a proximate result of his undergoing the surgery
to
which he did not consent, rather than a result of his original injury.").
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unchanged by this paper's proposals. The interests of attorneys and
healthcare professionals, on the other hand, are altered in that both groups
are exposed to increased liability for either failing to register an advance
directive or failing to comply with an advance directive. If these two groups
lose the common law battle against increased potential liability, their
professional self-interests will flip in favor of a well-functioning registry and
the safe-harbor it can provide. By utilizing the proposed registry, an attorney
advances a client's intent, which is the ultimate goal of representation in an
end-of-life setting. Furthermore, registering an advance directive makes it
readily available to healthcare providers treating patients facing end-of-life
health crises. Once retrieved from the national registry, a physician's
compliance with a declarant's advance directive not only satisfies the
also
Hippocratic Oath's modern command to avoid "overtreatment,"32 but
to
"right
legal
a
as
promotes what Justice Cardozo long ago described
determine what shall be done with his own body."3-5

i.
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325.

Schloendorff, supra note 57, at 93.

